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Abstract 
In our study we address the detection of uncertain GHG emission changes (also termed 
emission signals) under the Kyoto Protocol. The question to be probed is how well do 
we need to know net emissions if we want to detect a specified emission signal after a 
given time? No restrictions exist as to what concerns the net emitter. However, for data 
availability reasons and because of the excellent possibility of inter-country 
comparisons, the Protocol’s Annex I countries are used as net emitters. Another 
restriction concerns the exclusion of emissions/removals due to land-use change and 
forestry (LUCF) as the reporting of their uncertainties is only soon becoming standard 
practice. 
Our study centers on the preparatory detection of emission signals, which should have 
been applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. Rigorous preparatory signal 
detection has not yet been carried out, neither prior to the negotiations of the Kyoto 
Protocol nor afterwards. The starting point for preparatory signal detection is that the 
Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol comply with their emission limitation or 
reduction commitments. 
Uncertainties are already monitored. However, monitored emissions and uncertainties 
are still dealt with in isolation. A connection between emission and uncertainty 
estimates for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation has not yet been 
established. 
We apply four preparatory signal detection techniques. These are the Critical Relative 
Uncertainty (CRU) concept, the Verification Time (VT) concept, the Undershooting 
(Und) concept, and the Undershooting and Verification Time (Und&VT) concepts 
combined. All of the techniques identify an emission signal and consider the total 
uncertainty that underlies the countries’ emissions, either in the commitment 
year/period or in both the base year and the commitment year/period. The techniques 
follow a hierarchical order in terms of complexity permitting to explore their 
robustness. The most complex technique, the Und&VT concept, considers in addition to 
uncertainty (1) the dynamics of the signal itself permitting to ask for the verification 
time, the time when the signal is outstripping total uncertainty; (2) the risk (probability) 
that the countries’ true emissions in the commitment year/period are above (below) their 
true emission limitation or reduction commitments; (3) the undershooting that is needed 
to reduce this risk to a prescribed level; and (4) a corrected undershooting/risk that 
accounts for detectability, i.e., that fulfills a given commitment period or, equivalently, 
its maximal allowable verification time. 
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Our preparatory signal detection exercise exemplifies that the negotiations for the Kyoto 
Protocol were imprudent because they did not consider the consequences of uncertainty, 
i.e., (1) the risk that the countries’ true emissions in the commitment year/period are 
above their true emission limitation or reduction commitments; and (2) detectable 
targets. 
Expecting that Annex I countries exhibit relative uncertainties in the range of 5–10% 
and above rather than below, excluding emissions/removals due to LUCF, both the 
CRU concept and VT concept show that it is virtually impossible for most of the Annex 
I countries to meet the condition that their overall relative uncertainties are smaller than 
their CRUs or, equivalently, that their VTs are smaller than their maximal allowable 
verification times. 
Moreover, the Und and the Und&VT concepts show that the countries’ committed 
emission limitation or reduction targets ― or their Kyoto-compatible but detectable 
targets, respectively ― require considerable undershooting if one wants to keep the risk 
low that the countries’ true emissions in the commitment year/period are above the true 
equivalents of these targets. 
The amount by which a country undershoots its Kyoto target or its Kyoto-compatible 
but detectable target can be traded. Towards installing a successful trading regime, 
countries may want to also price the risk associated with this amount. We anticipate that 
the evaluation of the countries’ emission signals in terms of risk and detectability will 
become reality. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also suggests assessing total 
uncertainties. However, a connection between monitored emission and uncertainty 
estimates for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation, which considers the 
aforementioned risk as well as detectable targets, has not yet been established. The 
IPCC has to take up this challenge. 
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Preparatory Signal Detection for 
Annex I Countries under the 
Kyoto Protocol ― A Lesson for 
the Post-Kyoto Policy Process 
Matthias Jonas, Sten Nilsson, Rostyslav Bun, Volodymyr Dachuk, 
Mykola Gusti, Joanna Horabik, Waldemar Jęda and Zbigniew Nahorski 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope of the Study 
The focus of this study is on the preparatory detection of uncertain net greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission changes (also termed emission signals) under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
crucial question to be addressed is: 
How well do we need to know net emissions if we want to detect a specified 
emission signal after a given time?  
No restrictions exist as to what concerns the net emitter, which may be any GHG source 
or sink, e.g., a fossil-fuel powered plant, a terrestrial biospheric system or any part of it, 
or a combination of anthropogenic and terrestrial biospheric systems as envisaged under 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
Annex I countries are chosen as net emitters, simply for reasons of data availability and 
because of the excellent possibility of comparing net emitters (inter-country 
comparison). The countries’ emissions ― in an increasing number of cases even their 
uncertainties ― are available permitting the application of preparatory signal detection 
techniques, which are suited to address the aforementioned question. 
We currently discuss four hierarchically-ordered detection concepts to assess emission 
signals in a preparatory manner, that is, at two predefined points in time, t1 in the 
past/present (typically the base year) when emissions are known, and t2 in the future 
(typically the commitment year/period) when emissions are supposed to meet an 
agreed-upon target. These concepts allow to generate useful information beforehand as 
to how great uncertainties can be depending on the emission signal one wishes to detect 
and whether or not one tolerates risk. It is this knowledge on the required quality of 
reporting vis-à-vis uncertainty that one wishes to have at hand before negotiating 
international environmental treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol. The concepts can be 
considered standard as well as novel. 
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In contrast, signal detection in retrospect ( 2t t= ) and midway signal detection 
( 1 2t t t< < ) work differently and require a greater effort.1 Signal detection in retrospect 
is carried out at t2 and considers how an emission signal has evolved in reality between 
t1 and t2, taking its dynamics into account; while midway signal detection is carried out 
at some point in time between t1 and t2 and considers a signal’s path realized so far vis-
à-vis a possible path towards the agreed-upon emission target at t2. 
To facilitate structured acquaintance with the signal-uncertainty issue, we confine our 
study to preparatory signal detection. We discuss midway signal detection and signal 
detection in retrospect in follow-up studies. Another restriction concerns the exclusion 
of emissions/removals due to land-use change and forestry (LUCF) as the reporting of 
their uncertainties is only soon becoming standard practice. Therefore, we narrow the 
focus of our study to the countries’ anthropogenic GHG emissions (i.e., excluding CO2 
emissions/removals due to LUCF), when we refer to the detection of their emission 
signals. Nevertheless, we discuss extending preparatory signal detection upon carbon 
stocks. 
1.2 Signal Detection Under the Kyoto Protocol ― Current Status 
Rigorous preparatory signal detection has not yet been carried out, neither prior to the 
negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol nor afterwards. The same is true for midway signal 
detection. 
Nevertheless, monitoring of GHG emissions takes place. The secretariat of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) coordinates the 
development of guidelines for reporting GHG emissions and removals and for the 
technical review of emission inventories, while organizing these reviews and archiving 
inventory data (FCCC, 2004).2  
In addition to reporting annually on GHG inventories within the area covered by its 
Member States, the European Community, as a Party to the UNFCCC, also monitors all 
anthropogenic GHG emissions not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the Member 
States and evaluates progress towards meeting GHG reduction commitments under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. (Gugele et al., 2003:6). This monitoring process is 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 as well as Table 1. They give details, for each Member 
State and the European Union (EU) as a whole, of trends in emissions of the GHGs 
(CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6) up to 2001.3 Figure 1 follows the total emissions of 
the EU over time since 1990, while the distance-to-target indicator (DTI) introduced in 
                                                 
1
 For instance, Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol requires midway signal detection by 2005 when Annex I 
countries must have made demonstrable progress in achieving their commitments (FCCC, 1998). 
2
 In accordance with Articles 4 and 12 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC, 1992), 
and the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties (COP), Parties to the Convention submit to the 
secretariat national GHG inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. For Annex I countries, two sequential processes have 
been established: the annual reporting of national GHG inventories, and the annual review of the 
inventories (FCCC, 2004). 
3
 Emissions from international aviation and shipping, and emissions/removals due to LUCF, are not 
covered (EEA, 2003). 
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Figure 2, based on the country data listed in Table 1, is a measure of the derivation of 
actual GHG emissions in 2001 from the linear target path between 1990 and the Kyoto 
Protocol target for 2008–2012, assuming that only domestic measures will be used.4 
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Figure 2: Distance-to-target indicator (DTI) for EU Member States in 2001 (Kyoto 
Protocol and EU burden sharing targets). Source: EEA (2003). 
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 For example, Ireland is allowed a 13% increase from 1990 levels by 2008–2012, so its theoretical 
“linear target” for 2001 is a rise of no more than 7.2%. Its actual emissions in 2001 show an increase of 
31.1% since 1990; hence, its “distance-to-target” is 31.1 – 7.2, or 23.9 index points. Germany’s Kyoto 
target is a 21% reduction, so its theoretical “linear target” for 2001 is a decrease of 11.5%. Actual 
emissions in 2001 were 18.3% lower than in 1990; hence, its “distance-to-target” is (–18.3) – (–11.5), or 
–6.8 index points (EEA, 2003). 
Figure 1: Total EU GHG emissions for 1990–2001 in relation to the Kyoto target. 
Source: EEA (2003). 
a)
 The Danish DTI is + 0.9 if Danish GHG emissions in the base year are adjusted for 
electricity trade (import and export) and for temperature variations. 
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Table 1: 2008–2012 targets for EU Member States under the Kyoto Protocol and EU 
burden sharing. Source: EEA (2003). 
Member State Base Year
a 
(million tonnes) 
2001  
(million tonnes)
Change  
2000–2001
(%) 
Change Base 
Year–2001 
(%) 
Targets 2008–12 under 
Kyoto Protocol and “EU 
burden sharing” (%) 
Austria 78.3 85.9 4.8 9.6 -13.0 
Belgium 141.2 150.2 0.2 6.3 -7.5 
Denmarkb 69.5 69.4 1.8 -0.2 (-10.7) -21.0 
Finland 77.2 80.9 7.3 4.7 0.0 
France 558.4 560.8 0.5 0.4 0.0 
Germany 1216.2 993.5 1.2 -18.3 -21.0 
Greece 107.0 132.2 1.9 23.5 25.0 
Ireland 53.4 70.0 2.7 31.1 13.0 
Italy 509.3 545.4 0.3 7.1 -6.5 
Luxembourg 10.9 6.1 1.3 -44.2 -28.0 
Netherlands 211.1 219.7 1.3 4.1 -6.0 
Portugal 61.4 83.8 1.9 36.4 27.0 
Spain 289.9 382.8 -1.1 32.1 15.0 
Sweden 72.9 70.5 2.2 -3.3 4.0 
United Kingdom 747.2 657.2 1.3 -12.0 -12.5 
EU-15 4204.0 4108.3 1.0 -2.3 -8.0 
a
 Base year for CO2, CH4 and N2O is 1990; 1995 is used as the base year for fluorinated gases, as allowed 
for under the Kyoto Protocol. This reflects the preference of most Member States. 
b
 For Denmark, data that reflect adjustments in 1990 for electricity trade (import and export) and for 
temperature variations are given in brackets. This methodology is used by Denmark to monitor progress 
towards its national target under the EU “burden sharing” agreement. For the EU emissions total non-
adjusted Danish data have been used. 
Uncertainties are extracted from the national inventory reports of the Member States 
and are monitored separately. However, a connection between emission and uncertainty 
estimates for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation has not yet been 
established. A recent compilation of uncertainties has been presented by Gugele et al. 
(2003:Table 6) (see Table 2). This compilation makes available quantified uncertainty 
estimates from Austria, Finland, Netherlands and United Kingdom (total emissions and 
individual GHGs) and from Ireland (total emissions only). The uncertainties refer to a 
95% confidence interval5 and neglect, with the exception of the United Kingdom, 
emissions/removals due to LUCF.6 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The IPCC Good Practice Guidelines suggest the use of a 95% confidence interval, which is the interval 
that has a 95% probability of containing the unknown true emission value in the absence of biases (and 
that is equal to approximately two standard deviations if the emission values are normally distributed) 
(Penman et al., 2000: p. 6.6). 
6
 In the case of Ireland, the CO2 emissions arising from the liming of agricultural lands are not included 
under Agriculture, category 4 of the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National GHG Inventories 
(hereafter IPCC Guidelines; IPCC, 1997a,b,c), but they are accounted for under Land Use Change and 
Forestry: CO2 Emissions and Removals from Soil, LUCF category 5D of the IPCC Guidelines. The IPCC 
Guidelines make allowance for the alternative source allocation in the case of this activity (McGettigan 
and Duffy, 2003:Sections 1.5 and 1.8).
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Table 2: Overview of uncertainty estimates available from Member States (MS) 
excluding LUCF (with the exception of the United Kingdom). Source: 
Modified from Gugele et al. (2003:Table 6). 
MS Uncertainty estimates extracted from MS national inventory reports Source 
Uncertainty analysis including systematic and random uncertainty was carried out for CO2, CH4 
and N2O for 1990 and 1997. The results of the calculations are as follows: 
Total uncertainty CO2 CH4 N2O Total GHG emissions (excl. fluorinated gases) 
1990 2.3% 48.3% 89.6% 9.8% 
Austriaa 
1997 2.1% 47.4% 85.9% 8.9% 
Federal 
Environment 
Agency, Austria 
(2001) 
Denmark The national inventory report refers to Denmark’s second national communication where the 
uncertainty of NMVOC, CH4 and N2O is assumed to be the highest (perhaps with an uncertainty 
factor 2). The uncertainty of CO and NOx inventories is assumed to be less than 30–40% and the 
uncertainty of CO2 may be as low as 1–2%. Applying the methodology mentioned in Annex 1 of 
the reporting instructions of the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for national GHG inventories these 
estimates lead to an overall uncertainty of the GHG emissions in CO2 equivalents of +/-23%. This 
estimate does not take into account the 35% uncertainty of the GWP-factors. Sensitivity analysis 
shows that it is the huge uncertainty of N2O emissions from agricultural soils, which are the key 
factor for overall uncertainty of the Danish GHG inventory. Work is underway to implement 
uncertainty according to GPG. The results of this work are expected to be included in the Danish 
NIR 2004. 
National 
Environmental 
Research 
Institute (2002) 
In 2001 inventory, the uncertainty assessment was performed for the first time using the Monte 
Carlo simulation (Tier 2 method). The uncertainties in the input parameters were estimated using 
the IPCC default uncertainties, expert elicitation, domestic and international literature and 
available measurement data. A separate report on the uncertainty estimates (Monni and Syri 2003) 
will be published in 2003. According to the calculations, the uncertainty estimates for 2001 were 
as follows: 
Total GHGs CO2 CH4 N2O Fluorinated gases 
-5/+6% -4/+6% -19/+20% -33/+40% -53/+32% 
Finland 
The share of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion, which has low uncertainties, is large in 
Finland, thus resulting in a rather low total inventory uncertainty, though some input parameters in 
other emission categories have very large uncertainties. 
Ministry of the 
Environment 
(2003a) 
France Work is underway for estimating uncertainties of GHG emissions according to the Good practice 
guidance (IPCC, 2000). The uncertainties of CO2 and SO2 from energy use are assumed to be less 
than 5%. 
CITEPA (2001)
Germany The report states that partly emission uncertainties are considerable. This is due to uncertainties of 
activity data and emission factors and ― to a much lesser extent ― to a lack of information on 
emission-causing activities. In general, the uncertainty of combustion-related emissions is 
considerably lower than uncertainty of non-combustion-related emissions. The uncertainties are 
estimated to be higher for emissions after 1999 because they have to be considered as preliminary 
estimates. For qualitative estimates of emission uncertainties the report refers to the relevant CRF 
tables. 
Bericht 2002 der 
Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 
(2002) 
Ireland The Tier 1 method provided by IPCC (2000) has been used to make an uncertainty estimate of the 
Irish inventory time series for the years 1990–2000. This analysis results in an overall uncertainty 
of approximately 11% in the 2000 inventory of GHGs and a trend uncertainty of 5% for the period 
1990 to 2000. This outcome is determined largely by the uncertainty in the estimate of N2O 
emissions from agricultural soils, where an emission factor uncertainty of 100% is assumed in 
order to complete the analysis. This highlights the need for more reliable data on this particular 
emission source in Ireland. Two-thirds of total Irish emissions, i.e., the proportion contributed by 
CO2, are estimated to have an uncertainty of less than 2%. When CH4 is included, bringing the 
proportion up to 85%, the total uncertainty remains less than 4%, even though there are large 
uncertainties assigned to the CH4 emission factors in most source categories. However, it is the 
influence of N2O that leads to a substantial uncertainty in total emissions. This influence is not as 
large in the case of the trend, due to the modest change in emissions of N2O from 1990 to 2000 
and the relatively small share of this gas in total emissions. The impact of HFC, PFC and SF6 on 
inventory uncertainty in the year 2000 is negligible because these gases account for less than 1% 
of total emissions. 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency (2002) 
The Netherlands estimated uncertainty in annual emissions and in emission trends by applying the 
IPCC Tier 1 uncertainty approach at the level of the IPCC list of possible key sources. The results 
of the uncertainty estimates for 2000 CO2 equivalent emissions is as follows:  
Total GHGs CO2 CH4 N2O HFCs PFCs SF6 
±4% ±3% ±25% ±50% ±50% ±50% ±50% 
The results of the uncertainty estimates for the trend 1990–2000 CO2 equivalent emissions is as 
follows: 
Total GHGs CO2 CH4 N2O Fluorinated gases 
Netherlands 
±3% ±3% ±7% ±12% ±11% 
Olivier, 
J.G.J, 
Brandes, 
L.J., Peters, 
J.A.H.W. 
and Coenen, 
P.W.H.G. 
(2002) 
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Table 2: continued 
Spain The Spanish report mentions that the assessment of uncertainty (estimation of emission 
quality) is shown in Table 7 of the CRF using the quality codes H (high), M (medium), and L 
(low). This ordinal classification of quality is only a first stage in the analysis of the 
uncertainty associated with the inventory estimations. Work is now in progress for the 
implementation of a quantitative estimation of uncertainty in accordance with the approach 
recommended in IPCC (2000). 
Ministry of the 
Environment (2003b)
Sweden The uncertainty in reported emissions arises from the uncertainty in the activity data, 
uncertainty in emission factors and uncertainty arising from whether all (major) sources of 
emissions are included in the inventory. For most sectors Swedish official statistics are used 
as activity data, except for industrial processes, emissions from F-gases and for solvent use 
where information comes from the industries annual environmental reports. Used emission 
factors originate either from measurements from existing Swedish plants or from comparable 
European installations, where IPCC default emission factors are not used. In 2003 validation 
of uncertainties for the emission estimates will be started. It is assumed that the uncertainty is 
largest for the inventories of CH4 and N2O, perhaps with an uncertainty factor of 2, for 
NMVOC, which have been recalculated possibly in the order of 50%, while the uncertainty 
on the CO, SO2 and NOx inventories is assumed to be less than 30–40% and the uncertainty 
with the CO2 may be as low as 1–2%. 
Swedish 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
(2003) 
Quantitative estimates of the uncertainties in the emissions were calculated by using Monte 
Carlo simulation. This corresponds to the IPCC Tier 2 approach discussed in the Good 
practice guidance (IPCC, 2000). The results for the United Kingdom are as follows 
(calculated as 2s/E where s is the standard deviation and E is the mean, calculated in the 
simulation): 
 Total 
GHGs CO2 CH4 N2O HFCs PFCs SF6 
Emissions 2001 
(%) 
13 2.2 14 204 25 19 13 
Range of likely 
percentage change 
(2001 and 1990) 
-15/-10 -6.9/-4.2 -49/-31 -73/-17 -47/9 -76/-59 103/192 
United 
Kingdom 
The Tier 1 approach based on the error propagation equations suggests an uncertainty of 17% 
in the combined GWP total emissions in 2001. The analysis also estimates an uncertainty of 
2% in the trend between 1990 and 2000. 
National 
Environmental 
Technology Centre 
(2003) 
a
 Austria has, as the only Member State of the EU, carried out full carbon accounting (FCA) for 1990. Jonas and Nilsson 
(2001:Table 14) constructed a full carbon account, which serves as a basis for extracting a partial carbon account that is extended by 
CH4 and N2O and that is in line with the IPCC Guidelines (IPCC, 1997a,b,c). The respective relative uncertainties (more exactly: the 
median values of the respective relative uncertainty classes) are 2.5% for CO2; 30% for CH4; >40% for N2O; and 7.5% for CO2 + 
CH4 + N2O. 
1.3 Guide Through the Study 
The main focus of our study is on the preparatory detection of uncertain GHG emission 
signals. In Section 3, we present four hierarchically-ordered concepts and discuss their 
application in the context of Annex I country commitments. As mentioned before, such 
an assessment has not yet been carried out, neither prior to the negotiations of the Kyoto 
Protocol nor afterwards. However, signal detection of GHG emission signals without 
discussing its underlying theoretical basis may run the risk of falling short. Therefore, 
we present in Section 2 our uncertainty and verification framework, within which we 
see the detection of emission signals under the Kyoto Protocol embedded. An overview 
and the conclusions of our findings are presented in Section 4. 
2 Uncertainty and Verification Framework 
Section 2 puts the issues uncertainty, verification and signal detection into context. In 
Section 2.1, we discuss the question of where scientific uncertainties come from and 
scientific quality in terms of plausibility, validation and verification. In Section 2.2, we 
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address the question of whether the Kyoto Protocol is verifiable and describe in Section 
2.3 our understanding of signal detection in the presence of verification. In Section 2.4, 
we return to the issue of uncertainty and present a generally applicable uncertainty 
concept. 
2.1 Where Do Uncertainties Come From? 
We refer to Moss and Schneider (2000; see also Giles, 2002), who categorize 
uncertainties and espouse the use of a straightforward concept within the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to illustrate where scientific 
uncertainties come from. Their concept reveals the advantage of fundamental structure. 
It considers four main categories ― corresponding to confidence in the theory, the 
observations, the models and the consensus within a field ― to which we attach 
scientific quality labels to indicate whether plausibility, validation or verification 
(ascending order of strictness) can be achieved (see Figure 3). Here, we make use of 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam-Webster, 1973; 1997), which 
specifies plausibility, validation and verification ― in line with science theory ― as 
follows: 
Plausibility [from plausibilis = worthy of applause] → plausible: reasonable; appearing 
worthy of belief <the argument was both powerful and ~>. 
Validation [from validus = strong] → valid: well grounded or justifiable: being at once 
relevant and meaningful <a ~ theory>; logically correct (i.e., having a 
conclusion correctly derived from premises) <a ~ argument>. 
Verification [from verus = true] → verify: to establish the truth, accuracy, or reality.7 
In accordance with these definitions, only observations (measurements) ― uncertain per 
se ― can be verified within Moss and Schneider’s four-axis uncertainty concept, but 
none of the other categories. 
To justify theory as a self-standing uncertainty category, reference can be made, e.g., to 
the famous Michelson-Morley experiment performed by Albert Michelson (1852–1931) 
and Edward Morley (1838–1923) in 1887. It was motivated by the search for an 
absolute reference frame, within which absolute motion can be measured. This 
experiment can serve as a classical and illustrative example that theory and observation, 
although individually “solid”, did not match simply because the current physical 
understanding at that time was insufficient. However, theories, like diagnostic models, 
are our reflection of reality and can never be considered complete; final truth cannot be 
achieved. Therefore, theories and diagnostic models can only be validated or, 
alternatively, falsified (which is a controversially discussed issue on its own). 
                                                 
7
 It is noted that in the context of the Kyoto Protocol the term certification is also used, in particular by 
policy makers. It is specified as (Merriam-Webster, 1997): 
Certification [from certus = certain] → certify: to attest authoritatively; to attest as meeting a standard. 
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Figure 3: The four-axis concept of Moss and Schneider (2000; see also Giles, 2002) to 
trace where uncertainty comes from, modified to show which scientific 
quality in terms of plausibility, validation and verification can be achieved. 
Consensus (soft knowledge) as well as prognostic modeling also gives rise to 
uncertainty. However, these two categories can, at best, only be judged as plausible; 
they can neither be validated nor verified. 
Considering in the context of the Kyoto Protocol that GHG emissions are, in general, 
not directly measured but only measurement-based, we extend Moss and Schneider’s 
uncertainty category observations to also include the (not rigorously specified) category 
accounting. This permits us to also consider statistically surveyed data including 
(emission) data that are derived with the help of statistically surveyed data (e.g., activity 
data) in combination with literature-reported data (e.g., emission factors). 
Admittedly, the understanding of verification varies widely. For instance, the IPCC 
Good Practice Guidelines define verification with the view on GHG emission 
inventories (Penman et al., 2000:Annex 3): 
“Inventory definition: Verification refers to the collection of activities and 
procedures that can be followed during the planning and development, or after 
completion of an inventory that can help to establish its reliability for the 
intended applications of that inventory. Typically, methods external to the 
inventory are used to check the truth of the inventory, including comparisons 
with estimates made by other bodies or with emission and uptake measurements 
determined from atmospheric concentrations or concentration gradients of 
these gases.” 
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However, this definition requires discussion as it is not sufficiently rigorously in line 
with science theory8 and/or the intended purpose of the Kyoto Protocol, which may be 
colloquially expressed as: What matters is what the atmosphere sees! 
According to this definition, verification is a scientific process that aims at establishing 
the reliability of a measurement (here: inventory). However, similar to validity, a 
system-internal quality criterion, reliability is a measurement-reflexive quality criterion 
that should not be misunderstood with verification. Verification is more as it goes 
beyond validation or reliability. Moreover, towards checking the truth of an inventory, 
this definition allows putting “comparisons with [bottom-up emission] estimates made 
by other bodies”9 on the same level with “emission and uptake measurements 
determined from atmospheric concentrations or concentration gradients of these gases”, 
which is unacceptable from a science-theoretical point of view. 
It is instructive to examine the difference in terms of uncertainties between the two 
categories observations (including accounting) and modeling (see Figure 3) in more 
detail. Figure 4 presents a simplified illustration featuring accounting versus diagnostic 
and prognostic modeling. The accounting typically happens with a time step of ≤1 year 
(yr) and may be matched by a model during its diagnostic mode. During its prognostic 
mode, the model can, at best, only reflect a multi-year period that excludes singular 
stochastic events (although the model may operate with a time step of ≤1 yr). The 
uncertainty associated with accounting, UAccount, reflects our real diagnostic capabilities. 
It is this uncertainty, which underlies our past as well as our current observations and 
which, under the Kyoto Protocol, we will have to cope with in reality at some time in 
the future (e.g., commitment year period). This UAccount may decrease with increasing 
knowledge. (For simplification, we let UAccount stay constant in absolute terms over time 
in Figure 4) By way of contrast, UModel, the uncertainty of the model, always increases 
due to the model’s decreasing prognostic capabilities with time.10 
                                                 
8
 See, e.g., Lauth and Sareiter (2002). 
9
 In this context, the terms third-party verification or independent verification are also used. 
10
 The interrelation between UModel and UAccount during the model’s diagnostic mode can be made clear 
with the help of the notion of an ideal model. An ideal model perfectly reflects reality during the model’s 
diagnostic mode, that is, UAccount is identical with UModel. However, in practice, models are generally not 
able to reproduce UAccount for a number of reasons. An important reason is that, traditionally, model 
builders focused mainly on grasping mean values. In order to reflect more a complex reality, they 
resolved more detailed mean values. However, the consideration of uncertainties requires the opposite, 
that is, to simplify models, ideally to a level, which permits treating uncertainties as statistically 
independent (or as statistically independent as possible). In general, it may be noted that the choice of a 
(sufficiently) ideal model is a task in itself. 
 10
 
Figure 4: Simplified illustration featuring accounting versus diagnostic and prognostic 
modeling. U: uncertainty. Source: Modified from Jonas and Nilsson 
(2001:Section 2.2.2). 
2.2 Is the Kyoto Protocol Verifiable? 
Today’s global carbon research priorities focus primarily on the global and sub-global 
(regional) quantification of carbon sources and sinks and their combination in a closed 
budget, as well as understanding how the budget changes over time as a function of 
natural and anthropogenic perturbations. A number of measurements, including those of 
carbon isotopes and atmospheric oxygen as well as eddy covariance measurements, are 
combined to identify the different fluxes that result from the use of fossil fuels or are 
exchanged between land or ocean and the atmosphere (Heimann, 1996; Heimann et al., 
1999; Battle et al., 2000; Bousquet et al., 2000; Falkowski et al., 2000; Canadell and 
Noble, 2001; Prentice et al., 2001; House et al., 2003). In brief, this community follows 
in the footsteps of bottom-up/top-down verification on global and sub-global scales. 
However, the Kyoto Protocol requires that net emission changes (emission signals) of 
specified GHG sources and sinks, including those of the Kyoto biosphere but excluding 
those of the non-Kyoto biosphere,11 be verified on the spatial scale of countries12 by the 
                                                 
11
 Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Protocol stipulate that human activities related to LUCF since 1990 can also 
be used to meet 2008–2012 commitments (FCCC, 1998). The part of the terrestrial biosphere, which is 
affected by these Kyoto compliant LUCF activities, is hereafter referred to as Kyoto biosphere and its 
complement as non-Kyoto biosphere. 
 11
time of commitment, relative to a specified base year. The relevant question is then 
whether these emission signals outstrip uncertainty and can be verified. Living up to the 
intended purpose of the Kyoto Protocol and following science-theoretical standards 
require that these changes be verified by adopting an approach that takes an atmospheric 
view (what matters is what the atmosphere sees) and that is complete (leaving no 
unverified residues) (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Partial carbon accounting (PCA), as envisaged under the Kyoto Protocol 
(KP), is understood as a logical subset of consistent FCA. Consistent FCA 
on the spatial scales of countries requires the measurement of all fluxes, 
including those into and out of the atmosphere, and an atmospheric storage 
measurement, which ― to reflect the needs of the Kyoto Protocol ― permits 
to discriminate a country’s Kyoto biosphere from its non-Kyoto biosphere. 
The anthropogenic sector (simply referred to as fossil fuel of FF industry) 
also includes ground-based fluxes between countries (e.g., trade) and carbon 
stocks other than biospheric stocks. Source: Modified from Jonas and 
Nilsson (2001:Figure 14). 
Hence, verification under the Kyoto Protocol would require applying the concept of 
bottom-up/top-down (consistent or dual-constrained) full carbon accounting (FCA) on 
the country-scale, that is, the measurement of all fluxes including those into and out of 
the atmosphere (as observed on earth), but also an atmospheric storage measurement (as 
observed in the atmosphere), which ― to reflect the needs of the Protocol ― permits to 
discriminate a country’s Kyoto biosphere from its non-Kyoto biosphere. This type of 
                                                                                                                                               
12
 The country scale is the principal reporting unit requested for reporting GHG emissions and removals 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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FCA would permit verification that is ideal because it would work both ways (bottom-
up/top-down). However, it is unattainable as there is no atmospheric measurement 
available (and will most likely not be available in the immediate future) that can meet 
this discrimination requirement ― not speaking about the measurement’s spatial 
(country-scale) resolution requirements (WBGU, 1998; Jonas et al., 2000; 2004a,b; 
Jonas and Nilsson, 2001:Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.5).13 As a consequence, partial carbon 
accounting (PCA) as envisaged under the Kyoto Protocol can not be verified. 
2.3 Verification and Signal Detection 
To account for changes in anthropogenic CO2-equivalent emissions (simply referred to 
as fossil fuel or FF emissions) over time, the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that mean values 
are to be compared on the basis of percentages (of both the base year and the 
commitment period) (FCCC, 1998:Annex B).  Subtracting mean values (referring either 
to the beginning and end of the commitment period or to the base year and commitment 
period) is proposed for LUCF activities. Changes in net LUCF emissions are added to 
the countries’ change in FF emissions (FCCC, 1998:Articles 3.3, 3.4; 1999:Decision 
9/CP.4; 2002:Annex to Draft decision -/CMP.1). 
The IPCC (to which the Kyoto Protocol refers)14 defines uncertainty with respect to two 
predefined points in time (Noble et al., 2000:Section 2.3.7; Penman et al., 2000:Chapter 
6). Figure 6 reflects this concept, based on two different types of uncertainty, total and 
trend uncertainty.15 As we will see in the course of the study, the knowledge of total 
uncertainty at only two points in time may lead to interpretational difficulties as to what 
the emission signal is in consideration of its underlying uncertainty. Trend uncertainty is 
not favored by researchers in the field of signal detection because it provides only 
second-order information (related to the difference of a difference); that is, trend 
uncertainty can be used in investigating how certain or uncertain an emission trend is, 
but it provides no information whether or not a realized change in net emissions is 
detectable. 
                                                 
13
 In this context, it is useful to bear the following two remarks in mind: 
(i) It is almost impossible to trace emissions back to individual sources/sinks or source/sink categories 
(here: Kyoto and non-Kyoto LUCF sources/sinks) if their emissions/removals do not contain some sort 
of (e.g., CO2 or CH4) fingerprint that characterizes them (Penman et al., 2000:Annex 2, p.8; Jonas et 
al., 2000; Jonas and Nilsson, 2001:Sections 3.1.2; 3.1.5). 
(ii) The measurement of changes in a biospheric stock represents ― from a verification point of view ― a 
not necessarily consistent bottom-up measurement of the terrestrial biospheric net flux. 
14
 See FCCC (1998:Article 5; 2001a:Annex to Draft decision -/CMP.1; 2001b:Draft decision -/CMP.1; 
2002:Decision 11/CP.7). 
15
 The total (or level) uncertainty reflects our real diagnostic (accounting) capabilities, that is, the 
uncertainty that underlies our past as well as our current observations (accounts) and that we will have to 
cope with in reality at some time in the future (e.g., commitment year). The trend uncertainty reflects the 
uncertainty of the difference in net emissions between two years. 
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Figure 6: IPCC’s definition of uncertainty with respect to two predefined points in 
time based on two different types of uncertainty, total and trend uncertainty 
(see text for references). KT: Kyoto emission target; RC: emission reduction 
commitment. 
Looking ahead, we consider the merging of bottom up–top down (dual constrained) 
verification, as pursued by the global carbon research community, with temporal 
“verification” (better: signal detection), as demanded by the Kyoto Protocol, as a major 
research challenge. Box 1 visualizes this challenge graphically.16 
2.4 Uncertainty Concept 
An important question that remains to be answered is how to go about a mismatch of 
measured (or measurement-based) mean values including their uncertainties under 
validation or verification? Below, we propose an uncertainty concept that has already 
been put into practice under FCA to address the issue of consistency, as required for any 
system, or set of systems, under consistent FCA. The concept is presented graphically in 
Figure 7 (and discussed in more detail in Nilsson et al., 2000:Section 2.5; Jonas and 
Nilsson, 2001:Section 2.2.2). 
 
                                                 
16
 In Box 1 as well as in the remainder of the study, we use İ to symbolize total uncertainty. We prefer İ 
over σ, which is commonly used, to indicate that our understanding of uncertainty may go beyond the 
classical statistical understanding of uncertainty (see also Section 2.4). 
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Box 1: Dual-Constrained Verification and Signal Detection. 
 
Assume that we were able to repeatedly carry out dual constrained FCA for some terrestrial 
region at times t1 and t2 (appropriately averaged in space and time). Assume further that our 
bottom-up full carbon account would be higher resolved than our top-down full carbon account. 
Nevertheless, both the bottom-up and the top-down full carbon account would exhibit 
“reasonable” agreement, meaning that their mean atmospheric net fluxes would be sufficiently 
close and could be characterized by a combined uncertainty, which would be “acceptable”.  
However, although we would work bottom-up/top-down, i.e., apply dual-constrained FCA, we 
could still encounter potential difficulties, as the graph at the bottom of the figure shows. Here, 
for example, the change in the net emissions at t2 disappears within the constant-width 
uncertainty band. What must be kept in mind is that our bottom-up/top-down FCA technique 
refers to net atmospheric emissions and their uncertainties, but we need more than this when 
explicitly considering time and asking when the emission signal is outstripping uncertainty. To 
handle such situations, we have to additionally utilize signal detection techniques to achieve 
robust and sound verification. 
The uncertainty concept acknowledges that both available knowledge and lack of 
knowledge exists when accounting net carbon emissions. Available knowledge can be 
hard or soft, while lack of knowledge can be interpreted as the difference between an 
accepted and the (unknown) true value due to unknown biases. (The term value may be 
understood, e.g., as the net atmospheric carbon emissions of a country. Only a 
measurement device, located in the atmosphere, which would measure the country’s net 
carbon flux into the atmosphere, would permit cross-checking the ground-based 
experts’ estimate and thus the elimination of unknown biases.) Random errors and 
systematic errors (the latter are also called determinate errors or simply biases, while we 
prefer quantified systematic error or measured biases) are typically used to evaluate 
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hard as well as soft knowledge in terms of uncertainty. In contrast, lack of knowledge 
can only be addressed in a way that is necessary but not sufficient. This is done, as 
shown in the figure, by defining an uncertainty range that encompasses each of the two 
measured biases plus each of the two standard deviations representing the random errors 
of the two depicted measurement sets. 
 
Figure 7: The uncertainty concept applied under FCA to address the issue of 
consistency. The hypothetical starting point is an uncertainty range for two 
sets of measurements of the same phenomenon. Here, the uncertainty range 
encompasses each of the two measured biases plus each of the two standard 
deviations representing the random errors of the underlying measurement 
sets. Sources: Nilsson et al. (2000:Section 2.5), Jonas and Nilsson 
(2001:Section 2.2.2). 
In IIASA’s FCA studies with a focus on Russia and Austria, the term uncertainty was 
used exclusively in accordance with the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO, 1995) (see also Taylor and Kuyatt, 1994; NIST, 2001). For instance, the Austrian 
study only deals (with a few exceptions) with measured or measurement-based data, 
which are available either from one-sided statistics (a complementary data set does not 
exist) or from two-sided statistics (a complementary data set exists). Thus, the term 
uncertainty stands for random error or (0.5 * uncertainty range). Soft knowledge is 
generally not dealt with (thus, measured biases are not considered). 
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3 Preparatory Signal Detection 
In this section we present four hierarchically-ordered detection concepts to assess 
emission signals in a preparatory manner, that is, at two predefined points in time, t1 in 
the past/present (typically the base year) when emissions are known, and t2 in the future 
(typically the commitment year/period) when emissions are supposed to meet an 
agreed-upon target. These concepts allow to generate useful information beforehand as 
to how great uncertainties can be depending on the emission signal one wishes to detect 
and whether or not one tolerates risk. It is this knowledge on the required quality of 
reporting vis-à-vis uncertainty that one wishes to have at hand before negotiating 
international environmental treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol. 
In contrast to signal detection in retrospect ( 2t t= ) and midway signal detection 
( 1 2t t t< < ), preparatory signal detection is straightforward and requires the least effort. 
The four preparatory concepts presented in Sections 3.1–3.4 are the critical relative 
uncertainty (CRU) concept, the verification time (VT) concept, the undershooting (Und) 
concept, and the undershooting and verification time (Und&VT) concepts combined. 
They can be considered standard as well as novel. Their main features are summarized 
in Table 3. 
Table 3: The four preparatory signal detection concepts presented in Sections 3.1–3.4. 
Common to all of them is that the emission signal is investigated with 
reference to only two pre-defined points in time (t1 and t2).  
Preparatory Signal Detection Technique 
Section 3.1 Section 3.2 Section 3.3 Section 3.4 Taken into Account by the Technique 
CRU VT Und Und&VT 
Uncertainty 9 9 9 9 
Emission gradient between t1 and t2  9  9 
Undershooting   9 9 
Risk of not meeting committed target   9 9 
Corrected undershooting/risk    9 
Relevant background documents Jonas and 
Nilsson 
(2001:Section 
3.1.3); Gusti 
and Jęda 
(2002:Section 
3.2) 
Jonas et al. 
(1999, 
2004a,b); 
Jonas and 
Nilsson 
(2001:Section 
3.1.2) 
Nahorski et 
al. (2003) 
 
The following three arrangements facilitate easy notation throughout Sections 3.1–3.4: 
(1) Annex I countries are classified according to their emission limitation or reduction 
commitments (as a percentage of base year or period) under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Thus, they can be grouped into eight classes (see Table 4). 
(2) As already indicated in Section 2.3, different combinations of time points are 
referred to in the context of the Kyoto Protocol to account for GHG emissions and 
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removals by sink and source categories on the level of countries. Without restricting 
generality, we continue to use t1 and t2. They may refer to any two points on the 
time scale 0T 1990= , …, 15T 2005= , …, 18T 2008= , …, 20T 2010= , …, 
22T 2012= .
17
 
(3) The Protocol assigns different base years/periods to CO2, CH4 and N2O on the one 
hand and to the fluorinated gases on the other hand (see Table 4).  However, as the 
Annex I countries’ emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O by far exceed those of the 
fluorinated gases (HCFs, PCFs, SF6) (see the GHG Inventory Database of the 
UNFCCC: http://ghg.unfccc.int/), we can use the “CO2-CH4-N2O system of gases” 
as a reference in connection with temporal considerations, e.g., when we specify the 
time between a country’s base year/period and its commitment year/period.  
Table 4: Emission limitation and reduction commitments of Annex I countries under 
the Kyoto Protocol (KP). See ISO Country Code for country abbreviations. 
Sources: FCCC (1996:Annex B, Decision 9/CP.2); (1998:Article 3.8); 
(1999:Decision 11/CP.4). 
Country 
Group 
Annex I 
Country 
Base Year(s) for CO2, 
CH4, N2O 
(for HFCs, PFCs, SF6) 
Commitment 
Period 
KP 
Commitment
% 
1a See note below 1990 (1995) 2008–12 
1b BG 1988 (1995) 2008–12 
1c RO 1989 (1995) 2008–12 
1d SI 1986 (1995) 2008–12 
92 
2 US 1990 (1995) 2008–12 93 
3a CA, JP 1990 (1995) 2008–12 
3b HU 1985–87 (1995) 2008–12 
3c PL 1988 (1995) 2008–12 
94 
4 HR 1990 (1995) 2008–12 95 
5 NZ, RU, UA 1990 (1995) 2008–12 100 
6 NO 1990 (1995) 2008–12 101 
7 AU 1990 (1995) 2008–12 108 
8 IS 1990 (1995) 2008–12 110 
Note: 1a: AT, BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EC, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LI, LT, LU, LV, MC, NL, PT, SE, 
SK, UK. 
                                                 
17
 In Section 3, the year 2010 is used as commitment year if t2 refers to the temporal average in net 
emissions over the commitment period 2008–2012. 
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3.1 Critical Relative Uncertainty Concept 
Starting Point: Annex I countries comply with their emission limitation or reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Assumptions: (1) The relative uncertainty (ρ) of a country’s net emissions is 
symmetrical and does not change over time, i.e., ( ) ( )1 2t tρ ρ= . 
 (2) The absolute change in net emissions outstrips uncertainty at t2; 
i.e., the risk (probability) at t2 is zero (one) that a country’s net 
emissions are above (below) its base year emission levels in the 
case of a committed emission reduction (limitation). 
Key Question: What are the critical (or maximal) relative uncertainties that can be 
reported by Annex I countries so as to ensure favorable detection in the 
commitment year? 
With ix  denoting the net emissions (best estimate) and İi their absolute uncertainty at ti  
(i = 1, 2), we can write for the relative uncertainty: 
1 2
1 2
const
x x
ε ερ= = =  (1a,b,c) 
and for the ratio of emissions: 
2
1
x1
x
δ− =  (2) 
with KP:δ δ= , where KPδ  is the normalized emissions change committed under the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP) between t1 and t2 ( KP 0δ > : emission reduction; KP 0δ ≤ : emission 
limitation). Requiring that the absolute change in emissions outstrips uncertainty, 
1 2 2x x ε− >  (3) 
(see Figure 8 and also Appendix A), and making use of equations (1) and (2), we find: 
( ) ( )1 KP 1 KP 1x 1 x 1δ δ ε− − > −  (4) 
or 
( )
KP
KP1
δ ρδ >−  , (5) 
where 
( )
KP
crit
KP
:
1
δρ δ= −  (6) 
is called the CRU (Gusti and Jęda, 2002:Section 3.2). 
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Figure 8: Illustration of the CRU concept ( )1 2ρ ρ= : The absolute change in emissions, 
1 2 KP 1x x xδ− = , outstrips uncertainty at t2. KT: Kyoto target. 
Figure 9 displays equation (6) graphically, along with the positions that groups of 
Annex I countries hold (see also Table 5). For instance, a country of group 1 has 
committed itself to reduce its net emissions by 8% (( KP1 δ− )-axis). In the case of perfect 
compliance and under the condition of constant relative uncertainty, the country’s net 
emissions in the commitment year (t2) can only be detected favorably according to this 
concept if they are reported with a relative uncertainty that is smaller than 8.7% (ρcrit 
axis). With reference to the uncertainty estimates available from EU Member States, it 
appears that this value is difficult to achieve even for data rich and reliable countries 
like, for instance, Austria and Great Britain (see Table 2).18 
Note that a major dissimilarity exists between emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ) and 
reduction ( KP 0δ > ). In the case of undershooting (increase in į), Annex I countries 
committed to emission limitation must decrease their uncertainties in order to stay 
verifiable; their CRUs decrease. In contrast, countries committed to emission reduction 
do not need to do so; their uncertainties can even increase because their CRUs increase 
and can be more easily met. The opposite is true in the case of overshooting (decrease in 
į). Now, Annex I countries committed to emission reduction must decrease their 
uncertainties in order to stay detectable, while countries committed to emission 
limitation can even increase their uncertainties because their CRUs increase and can be 
more easily met. As also illustrated by Figure 9, the stabilized emissions case ( KP 0δ = ) 
                                                 
18
 Finland’s and Netherlands’ overall uncertainty estimates for CO2, CH4 and N2O are smaller than 
Austria’s and Great Britain’s (see Table 2), mainly because of their smaller uncertainty estimates for CH4 
(in comparison to Austria’s) and N2O (in comparison to Austria’s and Great Britain’s). Our experience 
indicates that Finland’s and Netherlands’ uncertainty estimates for CH4 and N2O are possibly too over-
optimistic. 
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requires relative uncertainties that are at least “small”. It becomes immediately obvious 
that this dissimilarity between emission limitation and reduction, which we will also 
encounter in the following section, will have far-reaching consequences, e.g., as to how 
emissions are rated economically. This dissimilarity is a direct consequence of not 
demanding KPδ  that is uniform for all countries under the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Figure 9: Critical relative uncertainty for Annex I countries according to equation (6). 
See Table 5 for country grouping. 
3.2 Verification Time Concept 
Starting Point: Annex I countries comply with their emission limitation or reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Assumptions: (1) The relative uncertainty (ρ) of a country’s net emissions is 
symmetrical and does not change over time, i.e., ( ) ( )1 2t tρ ρ= . 
 (2) The absolute change in net emissions outstrips uncertainty at times  
≤ or > t2; i.e., the risk (probability) at these times is zero (one) that 
a country’s net emissions are above (below) its base year emission 
levels in the case of a committed emission reduction (limitation). 
Key Question: What are the times (also called verification times) until the countries’ 
emission signals outstrip uncertainty? 
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Table 5: The CRU concept (equation (6)) applied to Annex I countries. In the last 
column, we assess the hypothetical situation that the CRU concept had been 
applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. Note the over-/ 
undershooting dissimilarity between countries committed to emission 
reduction ( KP 0δ > ) and emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). 
Country 
Group 
Base Year(s) for 
CO2, CH4, N2O 
Commitment 
Period 
KP 
Commitment
δKPa 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% 
If the CRU Concept had 
been applied 
1a 1990 2008–12 
1b 1988 2008–12 
1c 1989 2008–12 
1d 1986 2008–12 
8.0 8.7 
2 1990 2008–12 7.0 7.5 
3a 1990 2008–12 
3b 1985–87 2008–12 
3c 1988 2008–12 
6.0 6.4 
4 1990 2008–12 5.0 5.3 
-- -- -- 4.0 4.2 
-- -- -- 3.0 3.1 
-- -- -- 2.0 2.0 
-- -- -- 1.0 1.0 
(a) Compliance with the target: 
It must be expected that 
Annex I countries exhibit 
relative uncertainties in the 
range of 5–10% and above 
rather than below, excluding 
emissions/ removals due to 
LUCF. Thus, it is virtually 
impossible for most of the 
countries in groups 1–4 to 
meet the condition that their 
overall relative uncertainties 
are smaller than their CRUs  
(ρ < ρcrit). 
(b) Overshooting the target: 
To unambiguously attest a 
decrease in emissions, Annex 
I countries would have to 
fulfill even smaller CRUs as 
given in the column to the left.
(c) Undershooting the target: 
CRUs increase and could be 
met more easily. 
5 1990 2008–12 0.0 0.0 
6 1990 2008–12 -1.0 1.0 
-- -- -- -2.0 2.0 
-- -- -- -3.0 2.9 
-- -- -- -4.0 3.8 
-- -- -- -5.0 4.8 
-- -- -- -6.0 5.7 
-- -- -- -7.0 6.5 
7 1990 2008–12 -8.0 7.4 
-- -- -- -9.0 8.3 
8 1990 2008–12 -10.0 9.1 
(a) Compliance with the target: 
Same conclusion for countries 
in groups 5–8 as for countries 
committed to emission 
reduction (see (a) above). 
(b) Overshooting the target: 
CRUs increase and could be 
met more easily. 
(c) Undershooting the target: 
To unambiguously attest a 
decrease in emissions, Annex 
I countries would have to 
fulfill even smaller CRUs (as 
given in the column to the 
left). 
a
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  ― emission 
reduction; KP 0δ ≤  ― emission limitation. 
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To analyze the impact of uncertainty on the detectability of emission signals exhibiting 
different dynamics, we make use of the VT concept,19 which requires that the absolute 
change in net emissions (absolute emission signal) at time t2, ( )2x t∆ , is greater than 
the total uncertainty in the net emissions at time t2, ε(t2) (Jonas et al., 1999; Jonas and 
Nilsson, 2001:Section 3.1.2; see Figure 10 and also Appendix A). Mathematically, this 
condition is expressed as  
( ) ( )2 2x t tε∆ >  . (7) 
 
Figure 10: Illustration of the VT concept ( )1 2ρ ρ= : The absolute change in emissions, 
1 2 KP 1x x xδ− = , outstrips uncertainty at a) 2VT t> , b) 2VT t=  and c) 
2VT t< . 
                                                 
19
 The term “Verification Time” was first used by Jonas et al. (1999) and by other authors since then. 
Actually, a more correct term is “Detection Time” as signal detection does not imply verification. 
However, we continue to use the original term in this study as we do not consider it inappropriate given 
that signal detection must, in the long-term, go hand-in-hand with bottom up–top down verification. 
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Making use of linear approximations ― in line with preparatory signal detection ― we 
can specify ( )2x t∆  and write for ( )2tε : 
( )1
t t1 1
dx d
t t t
dt dt
εε ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜∆ > + ∆⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠  . (8) 
Rearranging inequality (8), we can solve for the VT, the minimal time t∆  required for 
the emission signal to outstrip its underlying uncertainty: 
( )1
t t1 1
t
t
dx d
dt dt
ε
ε∆ > ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 , (9) 
where: 
t t1 1
dx d
dt dt
ε⎛ ⎞⎟⎜> ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠  . (10) 
With the help of KPδ , the committed normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2 
(see Section 3.1), we can write for two terms in the denominator on the right side of 
inequality (9): 
( )KP 1
t 2 11
dx
x t
dt t t
δ
= −  (11) 
( )KP 1
t 2 11
d
t
dt t t
δε ε⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ =−⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ −  . (12) 
Thus, inequality (9) reads: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )1 2 1
KP 1 KP 1
t
t t t
x t t
ε
δ δ ε∆ > −+  ; (13) 
or, if the VT is normalized and expressed with the help of the relative uncertainty ρ: 
( ){ }2 1 KP KP KP KP
t
t t 1 sgn
ρ ρ
δ δ ρ δ δ ρ
∆
> =− + +  . (14a,b) 
The right side of inequality (14) becomes 1 for critρ ρ= , the CRU (see equation (6)). 
Table 6 lists with the help of inequality (14a) the normalized VTs for all Annex 1 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The VT concept provides a more generalized 
detection perspective for negotiators of the Protocol than the CRU concept presented in 
Section 3.1 because it quantifies in more detail what the consequences are in the form of 
normalized VTs if countries report emissions with relative uncertainties that are ≤ or > 
ρcrit. 
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Table 6: The VT concept (inequality (14a)) applied to Annex I countries. In the table, the 
countries’ maximal allowable VTs ( 2 1t t− ) are reported instead of their base years and 
commitment periods (see second and third columns in Table 5). The table should be read 
as follows: The maximal allowable VT for an Annex 1 country is given for 
critρ ρ= . For 
instance, for a country of group 1a the maximal allowable VT is 20 years or 1, if 
normalized. Normalized VTs equal to or smaller than 1 (see green fields for emission 
reduction and orange fields for emission limitation) are compatible with the Kyoto 
Protocol, i.e., countries report with 
critρ ρ≤ ; normalized VTs greater than 1 (see red 
fields) are not, i.e., countries report with 
critρ ρ> . In the last column, we assess the 
hypothetical situation that the VT concept had been applied prior to/in negotiating the 
Kyoto Protocol. Note the over/undershooting dissimilarity between countries committed 
to emission reduction ( KP 0δ > ) and emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). 
Normalized VTs if Countries 
report with ρ = Country 
Group 
Max. Allow.  
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP Commit. 
δKPb 
 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
 
% 2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
If the VT Concept had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.9 
2 20 7.0 7.5 0.3 < 1.0 1.9 3.3 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 0.4 1.2 2.2 3.8 
4 20 5.0 5.3 0.5 1.4 2.6 4.6 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 0.6 1.7 3.3 5.8 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 0.8 2.3 4.3 7.7 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 1.2 3.5 6.5 11.5 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 2.4 7.0 13.0 23.1 
(a) Compliance with the target: 
It must be expected that Annex I 
countries exhibit relative uncertainties in 
the range of 5–10% and above rather than 
below, excluding emissions/ removals 
due to LUCF. Thus, it is virtually 
impossible for most of the countries in 
groups 1–4 to meet the condition ρ < ρcrit 
or, equivalently, achieve normalized VTs 
≤ 1. 
(b) Overshooting the target: 
To unambiguously attest a decrease in 
emissions, Annex I countries would have 
to fulfill even smaller CRUs as given in 
the column to the left or, equivalently, 
find it even more difficult complying 
with normalized VTs ≤ 1. 
(c) Undershooting the target: 
CRUs increase and could be met more 
easily or, equivalently, compliance with 
VTs ≤ 1 becomes less difficult. 
5 20 0.0 0.0 infinite 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 2.6 8.1 17.6 42.9 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 1.3 4.1 8.8 21.4 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 0.9 2.7 5.9 14.3 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 0.6 2.0 4.4 10.7 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 0.5 1.6 3.5 8.6 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 0.4 1.4 2.9 7.1 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 0.4 1.2 2.5 6.1 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 0.3 > 1.0 2.2 5.4 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 0.3 0.9 2.0 4.8 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 0.3 0.8 1.8 4.3 
(a) Compliance with the target: 
Same conclusion for countries in groups 
5–8 as for countries committed to 
emission reduction (see (a) above). 
(b) Overshooting the target: 
CRUs increase and could be met more 
easily or, equivalently, compliance with 
VTs ≤ 1 becomes less difficult. 
(c) Undershooting the target: 
To unambiguously attest a decrease in 
emissions, Annex I countries would have 
to fulfill even smaller CRUs as given in 
the column to the left or, equivalently, 
find it even more difficult complying 
with normalized VTs ≤ 1. 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission 
reduction; KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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In short, the VT concept corroborates what has already been indicated by the CRU 
concept and which is a direct consequence of not demanding KPδ  that is uniform for all 
countries under the Protocol. For countries committed to an emission limitation 
( KP 0δ ≤ ), both the VT and the CRU concepts favor increasing over decreasing 
emissions, which is not in line with the spirit of the Kyoto Protocol.   
The VT concept has also been expressed on a probabilistic basis (Hudz, 2002; Hudz et 
al., 2002). However, before applying this approach in a preparatory signal detection 
context, we considered it more important to further deal with the over/undershooting 
dissimilarity of the VT concept between countries committed to emission reduction 
( KP 0δ > ) and emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ) (see Section 3.4). 
3.3 Undershooting Concept 
Starting Point: Annex I countries comply with their emission limitation or reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Assumptions: (1) Uncertainties at t1 and t2 are given in the form of intervals, which 
take into account that a difference might exist between the true but 
unknown net emissions and their best estimates. 
 (2) The relative uncertainty (ρ) of a country’s net emissions is 
symmetrical and does not change over time, i.e., ( ) ( )1 2t tρ ρ= . 
Key Question: Taking into account the combined uncertainty at t2 and considering that 
the true emissions are not known, how much undershooting is required  
to decrease the risk that countries do not undershoot (i.e., overshoot) 
their true emission limitation or reduction commitments? 
To capture any potential difference at ti between the true (t) but unknown net emissions 
t ,ix  and their best estimate ix , we introduce iε  (i = 1, 2): 
t ,1 1 1x x ε− ≤  , t ,2 2 2x x ε− ≤  . (15), (16) 
Applying the triangle inequality to the differences at t2 between target and actual 
emissions with respect to both the true emissions and their best estimates, we find: 
( ){ } ( ){ }KP 1 2 KP t,1 t,21 x x 1 x xδ δ− − − − −  
 
 
( )( ) ( )KP t,1 1 t ,2 21 x x x xδ= − − − + −  (17a,b) 
( ) ( )KP t,1 1 t ,2 2 KP 1 21 x x x x 1δ δ ε ε≤ − − + − = − +  . (17c) 
  Best estimates:              True emissions: 
Target ― Actual            Target ― Actual 
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Let 
( )12 KP 1 2: 1ε δ ε ε= − +  (18) 
denote the combined uncertainty at t2.20 Thus: 
( ){ } ( ){ } [ ]KP 1 2 KP t,1 t ,2 12 121 x x 1 x x ,δ δ ε ε− − − − − ∈ −  (19) 
or 
( ) [ ]t ,2 KP t ,1 12 12x 1 x Dx ,Dxδ ε ε− − ∈ − +  , (20) 
where: 
( )2 KP 1Dx : x 1 xδ= − −  .21 (21) 
We now introduce α to capture the risk that t ,2x  is equal to or greater than ( ) t ,11 xδ−  
with the help of: 
12 12Dx 2ε αε+ ≤  , (22) 
where 0 0 .5α≤ ≤  (see Figure 11). The risk 0.5α=  corresponds to the situation 
Dx 0=  ⇔ ( )2 KP 1x 1 xδ= − , when we can judge with equal confidence that t ,2x  is ≤ or 
( )KP t,11 xδ≥ − . With Dx decreasing ( Dx 0< ), the risk α also decreases that 
( )t ,2 KP t ,1x 1 xδ≥ − . 
Rewriting inequality (22), we find: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 12 12KP KP
1 1 1
x 1 1 2 1 1 2
x x x
ε εδ α δ α⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪≤ − − − = − + −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 . (23a,b)  
                                                 
20
 Equation (18) does not consider any correlation between 1ε  and 2ε  as the triangle inequality does not 
permit doing so. As a consequence, 12ε  is greater than 1ε  as well as 2ε  (for the range of KPδ  values 
considered under the Kyoto Protocol). 
21
 With the help of the inequalities (15) and (16) in the form of 
[ ]t ,1 1 1 1 1x x , xε ε∈ − +  , [ ]t ,2 2 2 2 2x x , xε ε∈ − +  , (15a), (16a) 
inequality (20) can also be derived if interval calculus is applied to the difference ( )t ,2 KP t ,1x 1 xδ− −  at t2 
(Nahorski et al., 2003): 
( ) [ ] ( )[ ]t ,2 KP t ,1 2 2 2 2 KP 1 1 1 1x 1 x x , x 1 x , xδ ε ε δ ε ε− − ∈ − + − − − +  (20a) 
 [ ] [ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 KP 1 1 KP 1 KP 1x , x , 1 x , x 1 , 1ε ε δ δ ε δ ε⎡ ⎤= + − − − + − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (20b) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 KP 1 2 KP 1 KP 1 2 KP 1 2x 1 x , x 1 x 1 , 1δ δ δ ε ε δ ε ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − + − − − − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (20c) 
 [ ]12 12Dx ,Dxε ε= − +  . (20) 
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Figure 11: Illustration of the risk α ( 0 0.5α≤ ≤ ) to capture the situation 
( )t ,2 KP t ,1x 1 xδ≥ − . Source: Modified from Nahorski et al. (2003). 
Using equations (1a,b) in combination with equation (18), 12
1x
ε
 can be expressed as: 
( )12 2KP
1 1
x1
x x
ε δ ρ ρ= − +  (24) 
and inserted into equation (23a): 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2KP KP
1 1
x x1 1 2 1
x x
δ α δ ρ ρ⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪≤ − − − − +⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 . (25)  
After rearrangement: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ){ }
( )
2
2
KP KP 2 2
1
1 1 21 1 2x 1 1
x 1 1 2 1 1 2
α ρα ρδ δα ρ α ρ
− −− −≤ − = −
+ − − −  . (26a,b) 
For the ranges of α and ρ values, which are of interest and which we consider in Table 
7, we can approximate inequality (26b) by 
( ) ( ){ }KP1 1 2 1 2δ α ρ≈ − − −  (26c) 
( )( ) ( )( ){ }KP KP KP KP1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1δ α δ ρ δ α δ ρ= − − − − = − + − −  . (26d,e) 
The last term on the right of inequality (26d), 
( )( )KPU : 2 1 2 1α δ ρ= − −  , (27) 
allows calculating the amount of undershooting, which is required for decreasing the 
“ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk that one is willing to tolerate vis-à-vis the 
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combined uncertainty 12ε  (Nahorski et al., 2003). Table 7 lists with the help of the 
second term on the right of inequality (26e), 
( )( )mod KP KP KP: U 2 1 2 1δ δ δ α δ ρ= + = + − −  ,22 (28a,b) 
modified (mod) emission limitation or reduction targets for all Annex I countries, where 
the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk is specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For 
comparison, Table B1 in Appendix B does the same but makes use of inequality (26a). 
Table 7 (see last column) shows that the Und concept is difficult to justify politically in 
the context of the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol, nonuniform emission limitation 
or reduction commitments (see KPδ  values in the third column) were determined “off 
the cuff”, meaning that they were derived via horse-trading and not resulting from 
rigorous scientific considerations. The outcome is discouraging. Varying KPδ  while 
keeping the relative uncertainty ρ and the risk α constant exhibits that Annex I countries 
complying with a smaller KPδ  are better off than countries that must comply with a 
greater KPδ  (see, e.g., modδ values for ρ = 7.5% and α = 0.3). Such a situation is not in 
line with the spirit of the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, the situation is different if the nonuniformity of the emission limitation or 
reduction commitments is the outcome of a rigorously based process resulting in a 
straightforward rule that applies equally to all countries, as it would be the case, for 
instance, under the currently discussed contraction and convergence (C&C) approach 
(e.g., WBGU, 2003; Pearce, 2003). Under such conditions, it is the undershooting U  
that matters, not the modified emission limitation or reduction target mod KP Uδ δ= + . 
Table 8 shows the undershooting U  that is contained in the modified emission 
limitation and reduction targets modδ  listed in Table 7. For comparison, Table B2 in 
Appendix B shows the undershooting U  that is contained in the accurate modified 
emission limitation and reduction targets modδ  listed in Table B1. 
However, here we proceed on the assumption that the emission limitation or reduction 
commitments KPδ  under the Kyoto Protocol were arbitrarily set. 
Appendix C generalizes the Und concept stochastically.  
                                                 
22
 Equations (27) and (28b) can also be derived if equation (24) is approximated by 
 ( )12 KP
1
2 1
x
ε δ ρ≤ −  , (24b) 
and can, as a consequence, be formulated more correctly: 
( )( )KPU 2 1 2 1α δ ρ≤ − −  (27a) 
( )( )mod KP KP2 1 2 1δ δ α δ ρ≤ + − −  . (28c) 
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Table 7: The Und concept (equation (28b)) applied to Annex I countries. The table lists modified 
emission limitation or reduction targets 
modδ  for all Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -
greater-than-( )KP t ,11 xδ− ” risk α is specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. The table should 
be read as follows: If an Annex I country complies with its emission limitation or 
reduction commitment, that is, ( )2 KP 1x 1 xδ= − , the risk that its true, but unknown, 
emissions t ,2x  are actually equal to or greater than its true, but unknown, target 
( )KP t ,11 xδ−  is 50%. Undershooting decreases this risk. For instance, a country of group 1 
has committed itself to reduce its net emissions by 8%. Reporting with a 7.5% relative 
uncertainty, the country needs to reduce its emissions by 21.8% to decrease the risk from 
50% to 0%. In the last column, we assess the hypothetical situation that the Und concept 
had been applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. Note the politically 
unfavorable situation, which arises when KPδ  varies while ρ and α are kept constant. In 
the table, the countries’ maximal allowable VTs as well as their CRUs are also reported 
(see Tables 5 and 6). 
Modified Emission Limitation or 
Reduction Target δmod 
in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country Group 
Max. Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −   
yr 
KP Commit.  
δKPb 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept had been 
applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
12.6
11.7
9.8
8.0 
21.8
19.0
13.5
8.0 
35.6
30.1
19.0
8.0 
63.2
52.2
30.1
8.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
11.7
10.7
8.9
7.0 
21.0
18.2
12.6
7.0 
34.9
29.3
18.2
7.0 
62.8
51.6
29.3
7.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
10.7
9.8
7.9
6.0 
20.1
17.3
11.6
6.0 
34.2
28.6
17.3
6.0 
62.4
51.1
28.6
6.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
9.8
8.8
6.9
5.0 
19.3
16.4
10.7
5.0 
33.5
27.8
16.4
5.0 
62.0
50.6
27.8
5.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
8.8
7.8
5.9
4.0 
18.4
15.5
9.8
4.0 
32.8
27.0
15.5
4.0 
61.6
50.1
27.0
4.0 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 
7.9
6.9
4.9
3.0 
17.6
14.6
8.8
3.0 
32.1
26.3
14.6
3.0 
61.2
49.6
26.3
3.0 
-- - 2.0 2.0 
6.9
5.9
4.0
2.0 
16.7
13.8
7.9
2.0 
31.4
25.5
13.8
2.0 
60.8
49.0
25.5
2.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
6.0
5.0
3.0
1.0 
15.9
12.9
6.9
1.0 
30.7
24.8
12.9
1.0 
60.4
48.5
24.8
1.0 
(a) For given įKP and α: 
The greater the ρ, the greater 
the modified emission 
reduction target 
modδ  is that 
keeps the “ t ,2x -greater-than-
( )KP t ,11 xδ− ” risk α at a 
constant level (see, e.g., 
country group 1: third line: 
modδ  values for α = 0.3). 
(b) For given ρ and α: 
The smaller the KPδ , the 
smaller the modified emission 
reduction target 
modδ  is that 
keeps the “ t ,2x -greater-than-
( )KP t ,11 xδ− ” risk α at a 
constant level (see, e.g., 
modδ  
values for ρ = 7.5% and α = 
0.3). As a consequence, 
countries complying with a 
smaller KPδ  (they exhibit a 
small 
modδ ) are better off than 
countries that must comply 
with a greater KPδ  (they 
exhibit a great 
modδ ). 
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Table 7: continued. 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
5.0
4.0
2.0
0.0 
15.0
12.0
6.0
0.0 
30.0
24.0
12.0
0.0 
60.0
48.0
24.0
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
4.1
3.0
1.0
-1.0 
14.2
11.1
5.1
-1.0 
29.3
23.2
11.1
-1.0 
59.6
47.5
23.2
-1.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
3.1
2.1
0.0
-2.0 
13.3
10.2
4.1
-2.0 
28.6
22.5
10.2
-2.0 
59.2
47.0
22.5
-2.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
2.2
1.1
- 0.9
-3.0 
12.5
9.4
3.2
-3.0 
27.9
21.7
9.4
-3.0 
58.8
46.4
21.7
-3.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
1.2
0.2
-1.9
-4.0 
11.6
8.5
2.2
-4.0 
27.2
21.0
8.5
-4.0 
58.4
45.9
21.0
-4.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
0.3
-0.8
-2.9
-5.0 
10.8
7.6
1.3
-5.0 
26.5
20.2
7.6
-5.0 
58.0
45.4
20.2
-5.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
-0.7
-1.8
-3.9
-6.0 
9.9
6.7
0.4
-6.0 
25.8
19.4
6.7
-6.0 
57.6
44.9
19.4
-6.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
-1.7
-2.7
-4.9
-7.0 
9.1
5.8
-0.6
-7.0 
25.1
18.7
5.8
-7.0 
57.2
44.4
18.7
-7.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
-2.6
-3.7
-5.8
-8.0 
8.2
5.0
-1.5
-8.0 
24.4
17.9
5.0
-8.0 
56.8
43.8
17.9
-8.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
-3.6
-4.6
-6.8
-9.0 
7.4
4.1
-2.5
-9.0 
23.7
17.2
4.1
-9.0 
56.4
43.3
17.2
-9.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
-4.5
-5.6
-7.8
-10.0 
6.5
3.2
-3.4
-10.0 
23.0
16.4
3.2
-10.0 
56.0
42.8
16.4
-10.0 
(a) For given įKP and α: 
Same conclusion for country 
groups 5–8 as for countries 
committed to emission 
reduction (see (a) above). 
(b) For given ρ and α: 
Same conclusion for country 
groups 5–8 as for countries 
committed to emission 
reduction (see (b) above). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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Table 8: The Und concept (equation (27)) applied to Annex I countries. The table lists 
the undershooting U  contained in the modified emission limitation and 
reduction targets modδ  listed in Table 7, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-
( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further 
explanations confer to the caption of Table 7. 
Undershooting U in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP Commit.  
δKPb 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept had been 
applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
4.6
3.7
1.8
0.0 
13.8
11.0
5.5
0.0 
27.6
22.1
11.0
0.0 
55.2
44.2
22.1
0.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
4.7
3.7
1.9
0.0 
14.0
11.2
5.6
0.0 
27.9
22.3
11.2
0.0 
55.8
44.6
22.3
0.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
4.7
3.8
1.9
0.0 
14.1
11.3
5.6
0.0 
28.2
22.6
11.3
0.0 
56.4
45.1
22.6
0.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
4.8
3.8
1.9
0.0 
14.3
11.4
5.7
0.0 
28.5
22.8
11.4
0.0 
57.0
45.6
22.8
0.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
4.8
3.8
1.9
0.0 
14.4
11.5
5.8
0.0 
28.8
23.0
11.5
0.0 
57.6
46.1
23.0
0.0 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 
4.9
3.9
1.9
0.0 
14.6
11.6
5.8
0.0 
29.1
23.3
11.6
0.0 
58.2
46.6
23.3
0.0 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 
4.9
3.9
2.0
0.0 
14.7
11.8
5.9
0.0 
29.4
23.5
11.8
0.0 
58.8
47.0
23.5
0.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
5.0
4.0
2.0
0.0 
14.9
11.9
5.9
0.0 
29.7
23.8
11.9
0.0 
59.4
47.5
23.8
0.0 
The undershooting U is not 
commented because of its 
secondary importance in this 
context (see text). 
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Table 8: continued. 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
5.0
4.0
2.0
0.0 
15.0
12.0
6.0
0.0 
30.0
24.0
12.0
0.0 
60.0
48.0
24.0
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
5.1
4.0
2.0
0.0 
15.2
12.1
6.1
0.0 
30.3
24.2
12.1
0.0 
60.6
48.5
24.2
0.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
5.1
4.1
2.0
0.0 
15.3
12.2
6.1
0.0 
30.6
24.5
12.2
0.0 
61.2
49.0
24.5
0.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
5.2
4.1
2.1
0.0 
15.5
12.4
6.2
0.0 
30.9
24.7
12.4
0.0 
61.8
49.4
24.7
0.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
5.2
4.2
2.1
0.0 
15.6
12.5
6.2
0.0 
31.2
25.0
12.5
0.0 
62.4
49.9
25.0
0.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
5.3
4.2
2.1
0.0 
15.8
12.6
6.3
0.0 
31.5
25.2
12.6
0.0 
63.0
50.4
25.2
0.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
5.3
4.2
2.1
0.0 
15.9
12.7
6.4
0.0 
31.8
25.4
12.7
0.0 
63.6
50.9
25.4
0.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
5.3
4.3
2.1
0.0 
16.1
12.8
6.4
0.0 
32.1
25.7
12.8
0.0 
64.2
51.4
25.7
0.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
5.4
4.3
2.2
0.0 
16.2
13.0
6.5
0.0 
32.4
25.9
13.0
0.0 
64.8
51.8
25.9
0.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
5.4
4.4
2.2
0.0 
16.4
13.1
6.5
0.0 
32.7
26.2
13.1
0.0 
65.4
52.3
26.2
0.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
5.5
4.4
2.2
0.0 
16.5
13.2
6.6
0.0 
33.0
26.4
13.2
0.0 
66.0
52.8
26.4
0.0 
The undershooting U is not 
commented because of its 
secondary importance in this 
context (see text). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 7). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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3.4 Undershooting and Verification Time Concepts Combined 
Starting Point: Annex I countries comply with their emission limitation or reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Assumptions: (1) Uncertainties at t1 and t2 are given in the form of intervals, which 
take into account that a difference might exist between the true but 
unknown net emissions and their best estimates. 
 (2) The relative uncertainty (ρ) of a country’s net emissions is 
symmetrical and does not change over time, i.e., ( ) ( )1 2t tρ ρ= . 
Key Question: Can the Und and VT concepts be combined, in accordance with the 
concept of bottom up–top down verification, so as to take advantage of 
both the Und and the VT concepts? 
Here, we refer to the introduction of risk as the strength of the Und concept and to the 
explicit consideration of time in detecting an emission signal as the strength of the VT 
concept. To be in accordance with the concept of bottom up–top down verification, we 
continue to compare the emission signal with the uncertainty that underlies the 
emissions, not the emission signal. This comparison builds upon total uncertainty, 
which is treated as statistically independent (see Appendix A for details). 
We proceed in three steps. In step 1 we consider our standard, which is given by the 
maximal allowable VT. In step 2 we focus on emission reduction ( KP 0δ > ). We 
introduce an initial or obligatory undershooting, where necessary, so that the countries’ 
emission signals become detectable (i.e., meet the maximal allowable VT) before the 
countries are permitted to make economic use of their excess emission reductions. In 
step 3 we focus on emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). We continue making use of the initial 
or obligatory undershooting unconditionally for all countries, before detectable 
reductions that countries might have already realized are considered. 
Step 1: Maximal Allowable VT 
Consider the case of (arbitrarily, but) linearly decreasing or increasing emissions. For 
decreasing emissions, the maximal allowable VT, 2 1t t− , is given for 
2 1 2x x ε= − , (29a) 
i.e., the maximal allowable VT applies when the upper (upp) border of the uncertainty 
band, ( ) 1 1 2upp 1
2 1 2 1
t
x t t x
t t t t
ε ε
=− + +− − , intersects the horizontal line 1x x=  at t2. 
Similarly, for increasing emissions: 
2 1 2x x ε= +  . (29b) 
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The maximal allowable VT applies when the lower (low) border of the uncertainty 
band, ( ) 1 1 2low 1
2 1 2 1
t
x t t x
t t t t
ε ε
= + −− − , intersects the horizontal line 1x x=  at t2. We can 
summarize equations (29a) and (29b) similar to equation (2): 
2
crit
1
x 1
x
δ= −  , (30) 
where 
( )
( )
2
2 1 KP
1
crit
2
2 1 KP
1
x x 0
x
for
x x 0
x
ε δ
δ
ε δ
⎧⎪⎪ < >⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪− ≥ ≤⎪⎪⎪⎩
 (31a,b) 
denotes the critical (crit) emission limitation or reduction target that matches an 
arbitrary ρ. (Note that we proceeded the other way around in Section 3.1, where we 
determined critρ  for a given KPδ .) To arrive at a more advantageous equation for 
determining critδ , we make use of 2 2
1 1
x
x x
ε ρ=  and equation (30) in combination with 
equation (31): 
( )
( )
2 1 KP
crit
2 1 KP
x x 0
1
for
x x 0
1
ρ δρ
δ
ρ δρ
⎧⎪⎪ < >⎪⎪ +⎪⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪− ≥ ≤⎪⎪ −⎪⎩
 . (32a,b) 
Referring to the VT concept (confer equation (9) of Section 3.2), 
( )1
t t1 1
t
t
dx d
dt dt
ε
ε∆ > ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 , (9) 
where ( )1 1tε ε= , 
crit 1 2
t 2 1 2 11
xdx
dt t t t t
δ ε
= =− −  (33a,b) 
(after inserting equations (30) and (31)), and 
2 1
t 2 11
d
dt t t
ε εε⎛ ⎞ −⎟⎜ =⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ −  , (34) 
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we find 2 1t t t∆ > − , with 2 1t t−  being the maximal allowable VT. 
To proceed, we distinguish between emission reduction ( KP 0δ > ) and emission 
limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). 
Step 2: Initial or Obligatory Undershooting for δKP > 0 
To begin, let us assume that Annex I countries comply with their emission reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, the uncertainties that the 
countries report might or might not be in accordance with KPδ , depending on whether 
critδ  given by equation (32a) is KPδ≤  (Case 1) or KPδ>  (Case 2); and, as a consequence, 
entail detectability or non-detectability. In the case of detectability, the VT is 2 1t t≤ − , 
the maximal allowable VT; while in the case of non-detectability, the VT is 2 1t t> −  
(see also Table 6). Case 2 requires correcting for non-detectability. The idea is to 
introduce an initial or obligatory undershooting GapU  so that the countries’ emission 
signals become detectable (i.e., meet the maximal allowable VT) before the countries 
are permitted to make economic use of their excess emission reductions. To adjust the 
Und concept to the conditions agreed upon above, we modify equation (18) of Section 
3.3 by limiting 12ε  by 2ε  (to be in accordance with the concept of bottom up–top down 
verification)23 and write equation (22) of Section 3.3 in the form: 
2 2Dx 2ε αε+ ≤  . (35) 
Inserting 
( )2 1Dx : x 1 xδ= − −  (36) 
(equation (21) generalized with respect to į) for Dx  in equation (35) and considering 
equality leads to 
( )2 1 1 2x x x 1 2δ α ε− =− − −  (37) 
or 
( )2 1 1 2x x x 1 2δ α ε− = + −  . (38) 
Making use of equation (38), i.e., 
( )1 2
t 2 11
x 1 2dx
dt t t
δ α ε+ −
= −  , (39) 
in the VT concept instead of equation (33) leads to 
                                                 
23
 Here, 12ε  is actually reduced as it does not consider any correlation between 1ε  and 2ε  (see footnote 
20). 
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( ) ( )
1
22 1 1 2 2 1
1
t
t t x 1 2 2
x
ε ρ
εδ α ε ε ε δ ρ α
∆
> =− + − − − + −
 . (40a,b) 
We write į as the sum of KPδ  and GapU  and investigate inequality (40b) with respect to 
our standard, the maximal allowable VT, i.e.: 
( ) 2KP Gap
1
1
U 2
x
ρ
εδ ρ α
=
+ + −
 . (41) 
Specifying 0.5α= , we find by making use of equation (31a): 
2
Gap KP crit KP
1
U
x
ε δ δ δ= − = −  . (42a,b) 
Equation (42b) is used to determine the initial or obligatory undershooting GapU , which 
is introduced so that the countries’ emission signals become detectable. 
As a consequence of introducing GapU , the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk (α ) 
changes. To grasp the changed, i.e., “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk ( vα ) (where 
“v” refers to “verifiable”), we start from a given undershooting with reference to KPδ , 
expressed by an inequality similar to inequality (26), namely24 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
KP KP 2 2
1
1 1 2x 11 1
x 1 1 2 1 1 2
α ρδ δα ρ α ρ
− −≤ − = −
+ − − −  (43a,b) 
 ( )( ){ }KP KP1 1 2 1δ α δ ρ≈ − + − −  , (43c) 
where 
mod KP Uδ δ= +  and ( )( )KPU 1 2 1α δ ρ= − −  ; (28a), (44) 
and express it correspondingly but with reference to critδ : 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
v2
crit crit 2 2
1 v v
1 1 2x 11 1
x 1 1 2 1 1 2
α ρδ δα ρ α ρ
− −≤ − = −
+ − − −  (45a,b) 
 ( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }crit v crit KP Gap v crit1 1 2 1 1 U 1 2 1δ α δ ρ δ α δ ρ≈ − + − − = − + + − −  (45c,d) 
where 
                                                 
24
 As a consequence of limiting 12ε  by 2ε  in equation (24), inequality (26) ― which makes use of 
equation (24) ― has to be re-derived, resulting in inequality (43). 
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mod KP vUδ δ= +  and ( )( )v Gap v critU U 1 2 1α δ ρ= + − −  . (46), (47) 
Continuing with the approximations and comparing inequalities (43c) and (45c), we 
thus find 
( )( )mod crit v crit1 2 1δ δ α δ ρ= + − −  (48) 
or 
( )
mod crit
v
crit
1 1
2 1
δ δα δ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , (49) 
respectively. Equation (49) is used to determine the changed risk vα  for a given 
modified emission reduction target modδ , where modδ  is given by equation (28a) in 
combination with equation (44) and critδ  by equation (32a). Tables 9 and 10 reflect the 
Und part of the Und&VT concept. They list, similar to Tables 7 and 8, modified 
emission reduction targets modδ  (equation (28a) in combination with equation (44)) and 
the undershooting U contained in modδ  (equation (44)) for Annex I countries, where the 
risk α  is specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. The validity range of vα  vis-à-vis α  is 
specified in Table 11. This table serves as a guide for Table 12, where vα  values are 
calculated. 
Table 12 (see last column) shows that vα  is greater than α . This is a consequence of 
the corrective increase of KPδ  to critδ  (where necessary). Part of the undershooting is 
used for this correction, with the result that the remainder of the undershooting ― now 
referring to crit KPδ δ>  ― exhibits a greater risk vα .  
Tables 13 and 14 reflect the straightforward application of the Und&VT concept, i.e., 
they make the step from “ modδ  given → vα  to be calculated” to “ vα  given → modδ  to be 
calculated”, where critδ  is now the new reference relevant for undershooting. The two 
tables list the modified emission reduction targets modδ  (equation (46) in combination 
with equation (47)) and the undershooting vU  contained in modδ  (equation (47)) for 
Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk vα  is specified to be 
0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. 
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Table 9: The Und part of the Und&VT concept (equation (28a) in combination with 
equation (44)) applied to Annex I countries committed to emission reduction 
( KP 0)δ > . The table lists modified emission reduction targets modδ  for all 
Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is 
specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further explanations confer to the 
caption of Table 7. 
Modified Emission Reduction 
Target δmod in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKP 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% α = 0.0α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
10.3
9.8
8.9
8.0 
14.9
13.5
10.8
8.0 
21.8
19.0
13.5
8.0 
35.6
30.1
19.0
8.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
9.3
8.9
7.9
7.0 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
21.0
18.2
12.6
7.0 
34.9
29.3
18.2
7.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
8.4
7.9
6.9
6.0 
13.1
11.6
8.8
6.0 
20.1
17.3
11.6
6.0 
34.2
28.6
17.3
6.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
7.4
6.9
6.0
5.0 
12.1
10.7
7.9
5.0 
19.3
16.4
10.7
5.0 
33.5
27.8
16.4
5.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
6.4
5.9
5.0
4.0 
11.2
9.8
6.9
4.0 
18.4
15.5
9.8
4.0 
32.8
27.0
15.5
4.0 
-- --- 3.0 3.1 
5.4
4.9
4.0
3.0 
10.3
8.8
5.9
3.0 
17.6
14.6
8.8
3.0 
32.1
26.3
14.6
3.0 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 
4.5
4.0
3.0
2.0 
9.4
7.9
4.9
2.0 
16.7
13.8
7.9
2.0 
31.4
25.5
13.8
2.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
3.5
3.0
2.0
1.0 
8.4
6.9
4.0
1.0 
15.9
12.9
6.9
1.0 
30.7
24.8
12.9
1.0 
See Und concept (Table 7).  
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
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Table 10: The Und part of the Und&VT concept (equation (44)) applied to Annex I 
countries committed to emission reduction ( KP 0)δ > . The table lists the 
undershooting U contained in the modified emission reduction targets modδ  
listed in Table 9, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is 
specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further explanations confer header to 
Table 8. 
Undershooting U in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKP 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% α = 0.0α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
2.3
1.8
0.9
0.0 
6.9
5.5
2.8
0.0 
13.8
11.0
5.5
0.0 
27.6
22.1
11.0
0.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
2.3
1.9
0.9
0.0 
7.0
5.6
2.8
0.0 
14.0
11.2
5.6
0.0 
27.9
22.3
11.2
0.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
2.4
1.9
0.9
0.0 
7.1
5.6
2.8
0.0 
14.1
11.3
5.6
0.0 
28.2
22.6
11.3
0.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
7.1
5.7
2.9
0.0 
14.3
11.4
5.7
0.0 
28.5
22.8
11.4
0.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
7.2
5.8
2.9
0.0 
14.4
11.5
5.8
0.0 
28.8
23.0
11.5
0.0 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
7.3
5.8
2.9
0.0 
14.6
11.6
5.8
0.0 
29.1
23.3
11.6
0.0 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.4
5.9
2.9
0.0 
14.7
11.8
5.9
0.0 
29.4
23.5
11.8
0.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.4
5.9
3.0
0.0 
14.9
11.9
5.9
0.0 
29.7
23.8
11.9
0.0 
See Und concept (Table 8). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5).
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Table 11: The validity range of the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk vα  vis-à-vis 
the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α . The table is self-explanatory and 
all entries can be derived (not done here) with the help of equation (49) in 
combination with equations (28a), (44) and (47). The table serves as a guide 
for Table 12, where vα  values are calculated for the modified emission 
reduction targets modδ  presented in Table 9. 
modδ  U =  α=  vU =  vα =  
Case 1: 
crit KPδ δ≤  
 The VT is 2 1t t≤ − , the maximal 
allowable VT. Equation (44), which 
permits to determine U for a given α or 
vice versa (knowing KPδ  and ρ), 
continues to stay valid.  
  
Case 2: 
crit KPδ δ>  
Reference (base year emissions) 
0 0.5 — — 
Emission reductions have not yet reached  
mod critδ δ=  (i.e., the initial or obligatory 
undershooting is not yet fulfilled). The risk 
v
α  is only defined for 
v Gap v,maxU U , U⎡ ⎤∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
 
see 
v
U  
Gap
max
U1 1
2 U
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪−⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
 
Gap crit KPU δ δ= −  
 
0.5 
 
( )max KPU 1 δ ρ= −  
 
0 
 
see U  max Gap
v,max
U U1 1
2 U
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪−⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
Reducing emissions beyond 
mod KP maxUδ δ= +  involves no risk α , which is only 
defined for [ ]maxU 0, U∈ . 
 
see 
v
U  
 
— 
( )
v,max Gap
crit
U U
1 δ ρ
=
+ −  
 
0 
 
1  
KPδ  
critδ  
1  
KPδ  
critδ  
( )
KP
KP1
δ
δ ρ
+
−  
( )
crit
crit1
δ
δ ρ
+
−  
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Table 12: The Und&VT concept (equation (49)) applied to Annex I countries committed to emission 
reduction ( KP 0)δ > . The table lists “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk values vα  for the 
modified emission reduction targets 
modδ  presented in Table 9. The table should be read as 
follows: Apply equation (32a) to calculate 
critδ . If crit KPδ δ>  (Case 2), the countries’ 
emission reduction commitments are not detectable at t2. As a consequence, the “ t ,2x -
greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α associated with a modδ  value listed in Table 9 requires 
correction. The changed risk 
v
α  derived with the help of equation (49) takes account of the 
initial or obligatory undershooting GapU , which is introduced so that the countries’ emission 
signals become detectable. Table 11 shows that 
v
α  cannot be specified if 
v GapU U<  or, 
equivalently, 
mod KP v critUδ δ δ= + <  (i.e., ( )v Gap Gap critU U , U 1 δ ρ⎡ ⎤∉ + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ). This case is 
referred to as “
v
α  n.d.” (
v
α  not defined). If, however, 
crit KPδ δ≤  (Case 1), the countries’ 
emission reduction commitments are detectable at t2. In this case, the risk value α continues 
to stay relevant; it does not require correction. This case is referred to as “take α”. In the last 
column, we assess the hypothetical situation that the Und&VT concept had been applied 
prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. In Case 2 note that, as a consequence of the 
increase of KPδ  by GapU  to reach critδ , vα  turns out to be greater than α . 
Changed Risk 
v
α  for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
2 1t t−  
yr 
KP 
Com. 
δKP 
% 
Crit. Targ. 
δcrit 
% 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und&VT Concept had been 
applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.164
0.270
0.482
αv n.d. 
0.229
0.348
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
2 20 7.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.197
0.304
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.244
0.365
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.065
0.166
0.368
αv n.d. 
0.230
0.338
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.259
0.381
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
4 20 5.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.131
0.233
0.437
αv n.d. 
0.262
0.371
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.274
0.398
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 4.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.197
0.301
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.295
0.405
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.289
0.414
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 3.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.264
0.368
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.327
0.439
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.305
0.431
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 2.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
0.088
0.188
0.389
αv n.d. 
0.330
0.435
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.360
0.473
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.320
0.447
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 1.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
0.288
0.389
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.396
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.392
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.335
0.464
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
Case (1): Inside the green-colored area 
(įcrit ≤ įKP): 
No necessity for introducing GapU , i.e., 
the α  values (here specified to be 0, 
0.1, 0.3, 0.5) continue to stay relevant. 
Case (2) Outside the green-colored area 
(įcrit > įKP): 
Overall: 
v
α α> . This is a consequence
of the corrective increase of KPδ  by 
GapU  to reach critδ . Part of the 
undershooting is used for this 
correction, with the result that the 
remainder of the undershooting, now 
referring to 
critδ , exhibits a greater risk 
v
α . 
(a) For given įKP and α: 
No monotonic relationship between 
ρ and the changed risk 
v
α , which 
replaces the constant-level risk α 
determined under the Und concept 
(see, e.g., fictitious country group 
for KP 4%δ = : first line: vα values 
for α = 0.0). 
(b) For given ρ and α: 
The smaller the KPδ , the greater the 
changed risk 
v
α  is that replaces the 
constant-level risk α determined 
under the Und concept (see, e.g., 
v
α values for ρ = 7.5% and α = 0.0).
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the temporal mean over the 
commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively (as specified in Table 5). 
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Table 13: The Und&VT concept (equation (46) in combination with equation (47)) 
applied to Annex I countries committed to emission reduction ( KP 0δ > ). The 
table lists modified emission reduction targets modδ  for all Annex I countries, 
where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk vα  is specified to be 0, 0.1, 
0.3 and 0.5. In the last column, we assess the hypothetical situation that the 
Und&VT concept had been applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto 
Protocol. Green-colored fields: crit KPδ δ≤  (Case 1). Note that the modδ  values 
from Table 9 continue to stay valid. White fields: crit KPδ δ>  (Case 2). Note 
the uniform appearance of modδ  for a given ρ  and vα , which results in the 
rectification of the Und concept (confer Table 9). 
Modified Emission Reduction 
Target δmod in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and 
Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
2 1t t−  
yr 
KP 
Com. 
δKP 
% 
Crit. 
Targ.
δcrit % 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
If the Und&VT 
Concept had been 
applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
10.3
9.8
8.9
8.0 
14.9
13.5
10.8
8.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
2 20 7.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
9.3
8.9
7.9
7.0 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
8.4
7.9
6.9
6.0 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
4 20 5.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
7.4
6.9
6.0
5.0 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
-- -- 4.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
6.4
5.9
5.0
4.0 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
-- -- 3.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
5.4
4.9
4.0
3.0 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
-- -- 2.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
4.9
4.4
3.4
2.4 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
-- -- 1.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
4.9
4.4
3.4
2.4 
14.0
12.6
9.8
7.0 
26.1
23.5
18.3
13.0 
46.2
41.5
32.3
23.1 
Case (1): Inside the green-
colored area (įcrit ≤ įKP): 
No necessity for introducing 
GapU , i.e., the modδ  values 
from Table 9 continue to stay 
valid. 
Case (2): Outside the green-
colored area (įcrit > įKP): 
Increase of KPδ  by GapU  to 
reach 
critδ , the new relevant 
reference for undershooting, 
which only depends on ρ  and 
v
α  and not anymore on KPδ  
(see equation (46) in 
combination with equation 
(47)). This explains why 
modδ  
appears uniform for a given 
ρ  and 
v
α . Thus, the 
Und&VT concept rectifies the 
Und concept (see Table 9), 
where countries complying 
with a smaller KPδ  exhibit a 
small 
modδ  while countries 
complying with a greater KPδ  
exhibit a great 
modδ . 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
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Table 14: The Und&VT concept (equation (47)) applied to Annex I countries 
committed to emission reduction ( KP 0δ > ). The table lists the undershooting 
vU  contained in the modified emission reduction targets modδ  listed in Table 
13, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk vα  is specified to be 0, 
0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. In the last column, we assess the hypothetical situation that 
the Und&VT concept had been applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto 
Protocol. Green-colored fields: crit KPδ δ≤  (Case 1). Note that the vU  values 
from Table 10 continue to stay valid. White fields: crit KPδ δ>  (Case 2).  Note 
the different behavior of vU  vis-à-vis U  (confer Table 10). 
Undershooting Uv in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
2 1t t−  
yr 
KP 
Com. 
δKP 
% 
Crit. 
Targ. 
δcrit 
% 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
If the Und&VT Concept 
had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.3
1.8
0.9
0.0 
6.9
5.5
2.8
0.0 
18.1
15.5
10.3
5.0 
38.2
33.5
24.3
15.1 
2 20 7.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.3
1.9
0.9
0.0 
7.0
5.6
2.8
0.0 
19.1
16.5
11.3
6.0 
39.2
34.5
25.3
16.1 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.4
1.9
0.9
0.0 
8.0
6.6
3.8
1.0 
20.1
17.5
12.3
7.0 
40.2
35.5
26.3
17.1 
4 20 5.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
9.0
7.6
4.8
2.0 
21.1
18.5
13.3
8.0 
41.2
36.5
27.3
18.1 
-- -- 4.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
10.0
8.6
5.8
3.0 
22.1
19.5
14.3
9.0 
42.2
37.5
28.3
19.1 
-- -- 3.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
11.0
9.6
6.8
4.0 
23.1
20.5
15.3
10.0 
43.2
38.5
29.3
20.1 
-- -- 2.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.9
2.4
1.4
0.4 
12.0
10.6
7.8
5.0 
24.1
21.5
16.3
11.0 
44.2
39.5
30.3
21.1 
-- -- 1.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
3.9
3.4
2.4
1.4 
13.0
11.6
8.8
6.0 
25.1
22.5
17.3
12.0 
45.2
40.5
31.3
22.1 
Case (1): Inside the green-
colored area (įcrit ≤ įKP): 
No necessity for introducing 
GapU , i.e., the U  values from 
Table 10 continue to stay 
valid. 
Case (2): Outside the green-
colored area (įcrit > įKP): 
The new relevant reference 
for undershooting is 
critδ  (see 
Table 13), which must be 
reached with the help of GapU  
so that the countries’ emission 
signals become verifiable. 
v GapU U=  for v 0.5α = . 
Similar to the undershooting 
U  in Table 10, countries 
complying with a smaller KPδ  
exhibit a great ( GapU , thus) 
v
U  while countries 
complying with a greater KPδ  
exhibit a small ( GapU , thus) 
v
U  (see equation (47)). 
However, the introduction of 
GapU  results in vU U>  and a 
variation of 
v
U  in 
dependence of KPδ  that is 
greater than that of U . 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
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Table 13 (see last column) shows for crit KPδ δ>  (Case 2) that the Und&VT concept 
rectifies the Und concept, which we applied under the assumption that the emission 
limitation and reduction commitments KPδ  under the Kyoto Protocol were arbitrarily 
set. Here, we refer to the politically unfavorable situation under the Und concept, which 
arises when KPδ  is variable while ρ and α are kept constant. The result of this was that 
Annex I countries complying with a smaller KPδ  exhibit a small modδ , while countries 
complying with a greater KPδ  exhibit a great modδ  (confer Table 9). This behavior is not 
apparent anymore with modδ  being uniform for a given ρ  and vα . However, the 
undershooting vU  contained in modδ  changes, as it depends on GapU , the initial or 
obligatory undershooting. Table 14 (see last column) shows for crit KPδ δ>  (Case 2) that  
vU U>  and that the variation of vU  in dependence of KPδ  is greater than that of U  
(confer Table 10). 
Appendix D presents tables similar to Tables 9, 10 and 12 to 14 by starting from 
inequalities (43a) and (45a) instead of their approximations (inequalities (43c) and 
(45c)). 
Step 3: Initial or Obligatory Undershooting for δKP ≤ 0 
Now KPδ  is ≤ 0 and, as shown in Figure 12, the countries’ emission signals have to 
tunnel through an even greater non-detectability range during the undershooting 
process. We regard this as a direct consequence of the haphazard political negotiation 
process of the Kyoto Protocol.25 Several possibilities exist to correct for this non- 
detectability drawback. Here, the idea is to continue making use of the initial or 
obligatory undershooting, irrespective of whether crit KPδ δ<  (Case 3) or crit KPδ δ≥  (Case 
4), and only then consider detectable reductions that might have already been realized in 
the case crit KPδ δ≥ . We consider this as being the most straightforward procedure. 
Case 3: δcrit < δKP. We start from inequality (43), which also holds for KP 0δ ≤ : 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
KP KP 2 2
1
1 1 2x 11 1
x 1 1 2 1 1 2
α ρδ δα ρ α ρ
− −≤ − = −
+ − − −  (43a,b) 
 ( )( ){ }KP KP1 1 2 1δ α δ ρ≈ − + − −  , (43c) 
where 
mod KP Uδ δ= +  and ( )( )KPU 1 2 1α δ ρ= − −  . (28a), (44) 
 
                                                 
25
 However, this does not mean that we do not approve KP 0δ ≤  situations. On the contrary, but these must 
be rigorously based and result from a straightforward rule that applies equally to all countries. 
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Figure 12: Initial or obligatory undershooting (indicated by the red arrows) for Annex 
I countries committed to emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). In the interval 
[ ]crit crit,δ δ−  emission signals are not detectable. Case 3: crit KPδ δ< . The 
reference for undershooting is critδ− . Case 4: crit KPδ δ≥ . The reference for 
undershooting is KP crit2δ δ− , which considers detectable emission 
reductions between KPδ  and critδ . 
As before, we express inequality (43) correspondingly but with reference to critδ− : 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
v2
crit crit 2 2
1 v v
1 1 2x 11 1
x 1 1 2 1 1 2
α ρδ δα ρ α ρ
− −≤ + = +
+ − − −  (50a,b) 
 ( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }crit v crit KP Gap v crit1 1 2 1 1 U 1 2 1δ α δ ρ δ α δ ρ≈ − − + − + = − + + − +  , (50c,d) 
where 
mod KP vUδ δ= +  , ( )( )v Gap v critU U 1 2 1α δ ρ= + − +  , (46), (51) 
( )Gap crit KPU δ δ=− +  , (52) 
and critδ  is given by equation (32b). Continuing with the approximations and comparing 
inequalities (43c) and (50c), we thus find 
( )( )mod crit v crit1 2 1δ δ α δ ρ=− + − +  (53) 
or 
( )
mod crit
v
crit
1 1
2 1
δ δα δ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪+⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪+⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , (54) 
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respectively, where modδ  is given (as before) by equation (28a) in combination with 
equation (44). However, as the intervals ( )KP KP KP, 1δ δ δ ρ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦  and 
( )crit crit crit, 1δ δ δ ρ⎡ ⎤− − + +⎣ ⎦  do not overlap, corresponding risks α  ↔ vα  cannot be 
determined.26 
Case 4: δcrit ≥ δKP. We adhere to the initial or obligatory undershooting which, however, 
we correct for detectable reductions between KPδ  and critδ  (see Figure 12). Thus, we 
express inequality (43), which is still valid in combination with equations (28a) and 
(44), correspondingly but with reference to crit KP crit2δ δ δ′− = − : 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
v2
crit crit 2 2
1 v v
1 1 2x 11 1
x 1 1 2 1 1 2
α ρδ δα ρ α ρ
− −′ ′≤ + = +
+ − − −  (55a,b) 
 ( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }crit v crit KP Gap v crit1 1 2 1 1 U 1 2 1δ α δ ρ δ α δ ρ′ ′ ′≈ − − + − + = − + + − +  , (55c,d) 
where 
mod KP vUδ δ= +  , ( )( )v Gap v critU U 1 2 1α δ ρ′= + − +  , (46), (56) 
Gap critU 2δ=−  , crit KP crit2δ δ δ′− = −  , (57), (58) 
and critδ  is given by equation (32b). Continuing with the approximations and comparing 
inequalities (43c) and (55c), we thus find 
( )( )mod crit v crit1 2 1δ δ α δ ρ′ ′=− + − +  (59) 
or 
( )
mod crit
v
crit
1 1
2 1
δ δα δ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪′+⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪′+⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , (60) 
respectively, where modδ  is given (as before) by equation (28a) in combination with 
equation (44). Again, as the intervals ( )KP KP KP, 1δ δ δ ρ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦  and 
                                                 
26
 The comparison of Tables 15 and 17 for 
crit KPδ δ<  (Case 3) shows that ( )( )mod equation 28a : 0δ α=  is 
always smaller than ( )( )mod vCase 3 : equation 46 : 0.5δ α =  for all listed values of KPδ  and ρ . 
Mathematically, an overlap of intervals would require 
( )( ) ( )( )mod mod vequation 28a : 0 Case 3 : equation 46 : 0.5δ α δ α= ≥ =  or, alternatively (after making use 
of equations (28a), (44), (46), (51), (52), and (32b)), 2KP critδ δ≥ . This is not possible because KP 0δ ≤  and 
2
crit 0δ >  for 0ρ> . 
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( )crit crit crit, 1δ δ δ ρ⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′− − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  do not overlap, corresponding risks α  ↔ vα  cannot be 
determined.27 
Tables 15 to 18 are the pendants to Tables 9, 10, 13 and 14, but now focusing on 
emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). Tables 15 and 16 reflect the Und part of the Und&VT 
concept. They list, similar to Tables 7 and 8, modified emission reduction targets modδ  
(equation (28a) in combination with equation (44)) and the undershooting U contained 
in modδ  (equation (44)) for Annex I countries, where the risk α  is specified to be 0, 0.1, 
0.3 and 0.5. Tables 17 and 18 reflect the application of the Und&VT concept. The two 
tables list the modified emission reduction targets modδ , i.e., 
crit KPδ δ<  (Case 3): equation (46) in combination with equations (51) and (52) 
crit KPδ δ≥  (Case 4): equation (46) in combination with equations (56)–(58), 
and the undershooting vU  contained in modδ , i.e., 
crit KPδ δ<  (Case 3): equations (51) and (52); 
crit KPδ δ≥  (Case 4): equations (56)–(58) 
for Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ+ ” risk vα  (Case 3) and 
the “ t ,2x -greater-than- ( )( )KP crit t ,11 2 xδ δ− − ” risk vα  (Case 4), respectively, are 
specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. 
Case 3 ( crit KPδ δ< ) exhibits modδ  and vU  values that behave similar to those achieved in 
Case 2 ( crit KPδ δ> ) of Step 2 above for Annex I countries committed to emission 
reduction. The uniform appearance of modδ  for a given ρ  and vα  results in the 
rectification of the Und concept (confer Tables 15 and 17: modδ  appears uniform for a 
given ρ  and vα ),28 while the behavior of vU  is more pronounced than that of U  
(confer Table 16 and 18: vU U>  and the variation of vU  in dependence of KPδ  is 
greater than that of U ). 
                                                 
27
 The comparison of Tables 15 and 17 for 
crit KPδ δ≥  (Case 4) shows that ( )( )mod equation 28a : 0δ α=  is 
always smaller than ( )mod vCase 4 : equation (46) : 0.5δ α =  for all listed values of KPδ  and ρ . 
Mathematically, an overlap of intervals would require 
( )( ) ( )( )mod mod vequation 28a : 0 Case 4 : equation 46 : 0.5δ α δ α= ≥ =  or, alternatively (after making use 
of equations (28a), (44), (46), (56), (57), and (32b)), ( )
2
KP 2
1
1
ρδ ρ
+≥ − . This is not in accordance with 
reality because KPδ  would have to be 1≥ , the smallest value that the term on the right can take on for 
0ρ =  ( 1ρ< ). 
28
 It is noted that for KP 0δ ≤  the VT concept is rectified as an over/undershooting dissimilarity between 
countries committed to emission reduction ( KP 0δ > ) and emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ) cannot occur any 
more (see Section 3.2). 
 48
Table 15: The Und part of the Und&VT concept (equation (28a) in combination with 
equation (44)) applied to Annex I countries committed to emission limitation 
( KP 0)δ ≤ . The table lists modified emission limitation targets modδ  for all 
Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is 
specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further explanations confer to the 
caption of Table 7. 
Modified Emission Limitation 
Target δmod in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKP 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% α = 0.0α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.5
6.0
3.0
0.0 
15.0
12.0
6.0
0.0 
30.0
24.0
12.0
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
1.5
1.0
0.0
-1.0 
6.6
5.1
2.0
-1.0 
14.2
11.1
5.1
-1.0 
29.3
23.2
11.1
-1.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
0.6
0.0
-1.0
-2.0 
5.7
4.1
1.1
-2.0 
13.3
10.2
4.1
-2.0 
28.6
22.5
10.2
-2.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
-0.4
-0.9
-2.0
-3.0 
4.7
3.2
0.1
-3.0 
12.5
9.4
3.2
-3.0 
27.9
21.7
9.4
-3.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
-1.4
-1.9
-3.0
-4.0 
3.8
2.2
-0.9
-4.0 
11.6
8.5
2.2
-4.0 
27.2
21.0
8.5
-4.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
-2.4
-2.9
-4.0
-5.0 
2.9
1.3
-1.9
-5.0 
10.8
7.6
1.3
-5.0 
26.5
20.2
7.6
-5.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
-3.4
-3.9
-4.9
-6.0 
2.0
0.4
-2.8
-6.0 
9.9
6.7
0.4
-6.0 
25.8
19.4
6.7
-6.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
-4.3
-4.9
-5.9
-7.0 
1.0
-0.6
-3.8
-7.0 
9.1
5.8
-0.6
-7.0 
25.1
18.7
5.8
-7.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
-5.3
-5.8
-6.9
-8.0 
0.1
-1.5
-4.8
-8.0 
8.2
5.0
-1.5
-8.0 
24.4
17.9
5.0
-8.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
-6.3
-6.8
-7.9
-9.0 
-0.8
-2.5
-5.7
-9.0 
7.4
4.1
-2.5
-9.0 
23.7
17.2
4.1
-9.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
-7.3
-7.8
-8.9
-10.0 
-1.8
-3.4
-6.7
-10.0 
6.5
3.2
-3.4
-10.0 
23.0
16.4
3.2
-10.0 
See Und concept (Table 7). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
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Table 16: The Und part of the Und&VT concept (equation (44)) applied to Annex I 
countries committed to emission limitation ( KP 0)δ ≤ . The table lists the 
undershooting U contained in the modified emission limitation targets modδ  
listed in Table 15, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is 
specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further explanations confer to the 
caption of Table 8. 
Undershooting U in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKP 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.5
6.0
3.0
0.0 
15.0
12.0
6.0
0.0 
30.0
24.0
12.0
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.6
6.1
3.0
0.0 
15.2
12.1
6.1
0.0 
30.3
24.2
12.1
0.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
2.6
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.7
6.1
3.1
0.0 
15.3
12.2
6.1
0.0 
30.6
24.5
12.2
0.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
2.6
2.1
1.0
0.0 
7.7
6.2
3.1
0.0 
15.5
12.4
6.2
0.0 
30.9
24.7
12.4
0.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
2.6
2.1
1.0
0.0 
7.8
6.2
3.1
0.0 
15.6
12.5
6.2
0.0 
31.2
25.0
12.5
0.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
2.6
2.1
1.0
0.0 
7.9
6.3
3.2
0.0 
15.8
12.6
6.3
0.0 
31.5
25.2
12.6
0.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
2.7
2.1
1.1
0.0 
8.0
6.4
3.2
0.0 
15.9
12.7
6.4
0.0 
31.8
25.4
12.7
0.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
2.7
2.1
1.1
0.0 
8.0
6.4
3.2
0.0 
16.1
12.8
6.4
0.0 
32.1
25.7
12.8
0.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
2.7
2.2
1.1
0.0 
8.1
6.5
3.2
0.0 
16.2
13.0
6.5
0.0 
32.4
25.9
13.0
0.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
2.7
2.2
1.1
0.0 
8.2
6.5
3.3
0.0 
16.4
13.1
6.5
0.0 
32.7
26.2
13.1
0.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
2.8
2.2
1.1
0.0 
8.3
6.6
3.3
0.0 
16.5
13.2
6.6
0.0 
33.0
26.4
13.2
0.0 
See Und concept (Table 8). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
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Table 17: The Und&VT concept applied to Annex I countries committed to emission limitation 
( KP 0)δ ≤ . Case 3 ( )crit KPδ δ< : equation (46) in combination with equations (51) and (52); Case 
4 ( )crit KPδ δ≥ : equation (46) in combination with equations (56)–(58). The table lists modified 
emission limitation targets 
modδ  for all Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-
( )crit t ,11 xδ+ ” risk vα  (Case 3) and the “ t ,2x -greater-than- ( )( )KP crit t ,11 2 xδ δ− − ” risk vα  (Case 4), 
respectively, are specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. In the last column, we assess the 
hypothetical situation that the Und&VT concept had been applied prior to/in negotiating the 
Kyoto Protocol. White fields: 
crit KPδ δ<  (Case 3). Note the uniform appearance of modδ  for a 
given ρ  and 
v
α , which results in the rectification of the Und concept (confer Table 15). 
Orange-colored fields: 
crit KPδ δ≥  (Case 4). Note that modδ  is dependent on KPδ , which is a 
consequence of how the undershooting is realized (detectable reductions are only considered 
after initial or obligatory undershooting). For the area in light orange confer to the caption of 
Table 18. 
Modified Emission Limitation Target δmod 
in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
2 1t t−  
yr 
KP 
Com. 
δKP 
% 
Crit. Targ. 
δcrit 
% 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
If the Und&VT Concept had been 
applied 
5 20 0.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
5.0
4.5
3.5
2.6 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
6 20 -1.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
5.0
4.5
3.5
2.6 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
-- 
 
-2.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
5.0
4.5
3.5
2.6 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
-- 
 
-3.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
4.6
4.1
3.1
2.1 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
-- 
 
-4.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
3.6
3.1
2.1
1.1 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
-- 
 
-5.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
2.6
2.1
1.1
0.1 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
-- -- -6.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
1.7
1.1
0.1
- 0.9 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
-- -- -7.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
0.7
0.2
-0.9
-1.9 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
7 20 -8.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-0.3
-0.8
-1.8
-2.9 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
-- -- -9.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-1.3
-1.8
-2.8
-3.9 
14.2
12.8
10.0
7.2 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
8 20 -10.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-2.3
-2.8
-3.8
-4.9 
13.3
11.8
9.0
6.2 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
Case (3): Outside the orange-colored 
area (įcrit < įKP): 
Increase of KPδ  by GapU  to reach 
critδ− , the relevant reference for 
undershooting which only depends on ρ
 and 
v
α  and not anymore on KPδ  
(see equation (46) in combination with 
equations (51) and (52)). This explains 
why 
modδ  appears uniform for a given 
ρ  and 
v
α . Thus, the Und&VT 
concept rectifies the Und concept (see 
Table 15), where countries complying 
with a smaller KPδ  exhibit a small 
modδ  while countries complying with a 
greater KPδ  exhibit a great modδ . 
Case (4): Inside the orange-colored 
area (įcrit ≥ įKP): 
Increase of KPδ  by GapU  to reach 
KP crit2δ δ− , the relevant reference for 
undershooting which, in contrast to the 
case 
crit KPδ δ<  above, still depends on 
KPδ  (see equation (46) in combination 
with equations (56)–(58)). This is a 
consequence of how the undershooting 
is realized (detectable reductions are 
only considered after initial or 
obligatory undershooting). The area in 
light orange indicates where 
KP critδ δ−  is actually greater than and 
could thus compensate any realized 
undershooting U  (see Table 18). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
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Table 18: The Und&VT concept applied to Annex I countries committed to emission limitation 
( KP 0)δ ≤ . Case 3 ( )crit KPδ δ< : equations (51) and (52); Case 4 ( )crit KPδ δ≥ : equations (56)–
(58). The table lists the undershooting 
v
U  contained in the modified emission limitation 
targets 
modδ  listed in Table 17, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ+ ” risk vα  (Case 3) 
and the “ t ,2x -greater-than- ( )( )KP crit t ,11 2 xδ δ− − ” risk vα  (Case 4), respectively, are 
specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. In the last column, we assess the hypothetical situation 
that the Und&VT concept had been applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. 
White fields: 
crit KPδ δ<  (Case 3). Note the different behavior of vU  vis-à-vis U  (confer 
Table 16). Orange-colored fields: 
crit KPδ δ≥  (Case 4). Note that vU  is independent of KPδ , 
which is a consequence of how the undershooting is realized (detectable reductions are only 
considered after initial or obligatory undershooting). The area in light orange indicates 
where KP critδ δ−  is actually greater than and could thus compensate the specified 
undershooting U  (confer Table 16). 
Undershooting Uv in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
2 1t t−  
yr 
KP 
Com.
δKP 
% 
Crit. Targ. 
δcrit % 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
av = 0.0 
av = 0.1 
av = 0.3 
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
If the Und&VT Concept had been 
applied 
5 20 0.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
5.0 
4.5 
3.5 
2.6 
15.0
13.6
10.9
8.1 
30.0
27.5
22.6
17.6 
60.0
56.6
49.7
42.9 
6 20 -1.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
6.0 
5.5 
4.5 
3.6 
16.0
14.6
11.9
9.1 
31.0
28.5
23.6
18.6 
61.0
57.6
50.7
43.9 
-- 
 
-2.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.0 
6.5 
5.5 
4.6 
17.0
15.6
12.9
10.1 
32.0
29.5
24.6
19.6 
62.0
58.6
51.7
44.9 
-- 
 
-3.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.6 
7.1 
6.1 
5.1 
18.0
16.6
13.9
11.1 
33.0
30.5
25.6
20.6 
63.0
59.6
52.7
45.9 
-- 
 
-4.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.6 
7.1 
6.1 
5.1 
19.0
17.6
14.9
12.1 
34.0
31.5
26.6
21.6 
64.0
60.6
53.7
46.9 
-- 
 
-5.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.6 
7.1 
6.1 
5.1 
20.0
18.6
15.9
13.1 
35.0
32.5
27.6
22.6 
65.0
61.6
54.7
47.9 
-- -- -6.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.7 
7.1 
6.1 
5.1 
21.0
19.6
16.9
14.1 
36.0
33.5
28.6
23.6 
66.0
62.6
55.7
48.9 
-- -- -7.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.7 
7.2 
6.1 
5.1 
22.0
20.6
17.9
15.1 
37.0
34.5
29.6
24.6 
67.0
63.6
56.7
49.9 
7 20 -8.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.7 
7.2 
6.2 
5.1 
23.0
21.6
18.9
16.1 
38.0
35.5
30.6
25.6 
68.0
64.6
57.7
50.9 
-- -- -9.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.7 
7.2 
6.2 
5.1 
23.2
21.8
19.0
16.2 
39.0
36.5
31.6
26.6 
69.0
65.6
58.7
51.9 
8 20 -10.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.8 
7.2 
6.2 
5.1 
23.3
21.8
19.0
16.2 
40.0
37.5
32.6
27.6 
70.0
66.6
59.7
52.9 
(I) Outside the orange-colored area (įcrit < įKP): 
The relevant reference for undershooting is 
critδ−  (see Table 17), which must be reached 
with the help of GapU  so that the countries’ 
emission signals become detectable. 
v GapU U=  for v 0.5α = . Similar to the 
undershooting U  in Table 16, countries 
complying with a smaller KPδ  exhibit a great 
( GapU , thus) vU  while countries complying 
with a greater KPδ  exhibit a small ( GapU , 
thus) 
v
U  see equations (51) and (52). 
However, the introduction of GapU  results in 
v
U U>  and a variation of 
v
U  in 
dependence of KPδ  that is greater than that of 
U . 
(II) Inside the orange-colored area (įcrit ≥ įKP): 
The relevant reference for undershooting is 
KP crit2δ δ−  (see Table 17), which is to be 
reached with the help of GapU . v GapU U=  
for 
v
0.5α = . Unlike 
modδ , vU  mainly 
depends on ρ  and 
v
α  and only slightly on 
KPδ  (see equations (56)–(58)). This is a 
consequence of how the undershooting is 
realized (detectable reductions are only 
considered after initial or obligatory 
undershooting). Still, 
v
U U> . The area in 
light orange indicates where KP critδ δ−  is 
actually greater than and could thus 
compensate the specified undershooting U  
(confer Table 16). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
 52
Case 4 ( crit KPδ δ≥ ) exhibits modδ  and vU  values that behave the other way around: modδ  
is now dependent on and vU  is (not independent of but) only slightly dependent on KPδ  
(with vU  still > U ). This is a consequence of how the undershooting is realized 
(detectable reductions are only considered after initial or obligatory undershooting) and 
what we consider as being the most straightforward procedure of dealing with the non-
detectability of emission signals in the interval [ ]crit crit,δ δ− . 
Appendix D presents tables similar to Tables 15 to 18 by starting from inequalities 
(43a), (50a) and (55a) instead of their approximations (inequalities (43c), (50c) and 
(55c)). 
4 Conclusions 
The conclusions of our study are grouped according to their relevance to (I) verification, 
(II) the detection of emission signals, and (III) the detection of stock signals. The 
conclusions are preceded by an overview that facilitates the general classification of our 
study. 
Overview 
In our study we address the detection of uncertain GHG emission signals under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The question to be probed is how well do we need to know net 
emissions if we want to detect a specified emission signal after a given time? No 
restrictions exist as to what concerns the net emitter, which may be any GHG source or 
sink, e.g., a fossil-fuel powered plant, a terrestrial biospheric system or any part of it, or 
even a combination of anthropogenic and terrestrial biospheric systems as envisaged 
under the Kyoto Protocol. However, for data availability reasons and because of the 
excellent possibility of inter-country comparisons, the Protocol’s Annex I countries are 
used as net emitters. Another restriction concerns the exclusion of emissions/removals 
due to LUCF as the reporting of their uncertainties is only soon becoming standard 
practice. Therefore, we narrow the focus of our study to the countries’ anthropogenic 
GHG emissions, i.e., excluding CO2 emissions/removals due to LUCF, when we refer to 
the detection of their emission signals. 
Our study centers on the preparatory detection of emission signals (which should have 
been applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol), while midway signal detection 
(which should be applied, e.g., in 2005) and signal detection in retrospect (which should 
be applied, e.g., in 2008–2012) will be dealt with in follow-up studies. Rigorous 
preparatory signal detection has not yet been carried out, neither prior to the 
negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol nor afterwards. The same is true for midway signal 
detection. The starting point for preparatory signal detection is that the Annex I 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol comply with their emission limitation or reduction 
commitments. 
Uncertainties are already monitored, e.g., are they extracted as 95% confidence intervals 
from the national inventory reports of the EU Member States (ranging between 5–10% 
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and above rather than below, excluding emissions/removals due to LUCF). However, 
monitored emissions and uncertainties are still dealt with in isolation. A connection 
between emission and uncertainty estimates for the purpose of an advanced country 
evaluation has not yet been established. 
We use relative uncertainties of 2.5, 7.5, 15 and 30% when we evaluate Annex I 
countries in the context of our preparatory signal detection concepts. These values are 
understood as the median values of relative uncertainty classes following a suggestion 
by Jonas and Nilsson (2001), who recommended in their earlier study the application of 
relative uncertainty classes as a common good practice measure. (The authors used the 
relative uncertainty classes [ ]0, 5 , [ ]5, 10 , [ ]10, 20 , [ ]20, 40  and 40%> .) The classes 
constitute a robust means to get an effective grip on uncertainties in light of the 
numerous data limitations and intra and inter-country inconsistencies, which do not 
justify the reporting of exact relative uncertainties. 
(I) Verification 
• The Kyoto Protocol can only be verified on the basis of bottom-up/top-down 
(consistent or dual-constrained) FCA, where the biosphere must be treated as one 
system and must not be split up into a Kyoto and a non-Kyoto biosphere (that is, the 
subsystems of a system can only be verified if they can be discriminated). 
• Signal detection does not imply verification. Verification of emissions, in turn, does 
not imply, as a consequence of uncertainty, the detectability of emission signals. 
Therefore, the verification of emissions and the detection of emission signals must 
go hand-in-hand. We consider merging the two as a major research challenge, which 
needs to be taken up if the Kyoto Protocol is to be put on a sound basis. 
• Bottom up–top down verification strongly suggests favoring total uncertainty over 
trend uncertainty. Total uncertainty matters as long as bottom up–top down 
verification is not in place and the accuracy of mean emission values is an issue. By 
contrast, trend uncertainty can be used in investigating how certain or uncertain an 
emission trend is, but it provides no information whether or not a realized emission 
change is detectable. 
(II) Detection of Emission Signals 
• We applied four preparatory signal detection techniques by using Annex I countries 
as an example. These are the CRU concept; its generalization, the VT concept; the 
Und concept; and the Und and VT concepts combined, termed Und&VT concept. 
All of the techniques identify an emission signal and consider the total uncertainty 
that underlies the countries’ emissions, either in the commitment year/period or in 
both the base year and the commitment year/period. The techniques follow a 
hierarchical order in terms of complexity permitting to explore their robustness. The 
most complex technique, the Und&VT concept, considers in addition to uncertainty 
(1) the dynamics of the signal itself permitting to ask for the verification time, the 
time when the signal is outstripping total uncertainty; (2) the risk (probability) that 
the countries’ true emissions in the commitment year/period are above (below) their 
true emission limitation or reduction commitments; (3) the undershooting that is 
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needed to reduce this risk to a prescribed level; and (4) a corrected 
undershooting/risk that accounts for detectability, i.e., that fulfills a given 
commitment period/maximal allowable verification time. Table 19 summarizes the 
results of the four detection techniques, while Table 20 lists the techniques’ major 
pros and cons as well as our major findings. 
• This preparatory signal detection exercise exemplifies that the negotiations for the 
Kyoto Protocol were imprudent because they did not consider the consequences of 
uncertainty, i.e., (1) the risk that the countries’ true emissions in the commitment 
year/period are above their true emission limitation or reduction commitments (Und, 
Und&VT); and (2) detectable targets (CRU, VT, Und&VT). Based on Tables 19 
and 20, the following overall conclusion can be drawn: 
Expecting that Annex I countries exhibit relative uncertainties in the range of 5–
10% and above rather than below, excluding emissions/removals due to LUCF, both 
the CRU concept and VT concept show that it is virtually impossible for most of the 
Annex I countries to meet the condition that their overall relative uncertainties are 
smaller than their CRUs or, equivalently, that their VTs are smaller than their 
maximal allowable verification times. 
In the case of the Und concept, the modified emission limitation or reduction targets 
modδ  of the countries require considerable undershooting of their committed Kyoto 
targets if one wants to keep the risk low ( 0.1α≈ ) that the countries’ true emissions 
in the commitment year/period are above the true equivalents of these targets. 
The situation for the Und&VT concept is similar. In this case the modified emission 
limitation or reduction targets modδ  of the countries also require considerable 
undershooting of their Kyoto-compatible, but detectable, targets if one wants to 
keep the risk low ( v 0.1α ≈ ) that the countries’ true emissions in the commitment 
year/period are above the true equivalents of these targets. 
• The amount by which a country undershoots its Kyoto target (Und) or its Kyoto-
compatible, but detectable, target (Und&VT) can be traded. Towards installing a 
successful trading regime, countries may want to also price the risk associated with 
this amount. We anticipate that the evaluation of the countries’ emission signals in 
terms of risk and detectability will become reality. 
• The IPCC also suggests assessing total uncertainties. However, a connection 
between monitored emission and uncertainty estimates for the purpose of an 
advanced country evaluation, which considers the aforementioned risk as well as 
detectable targets, has not yet been established. The IPCC has to take up this 
challenge. 
(III) Detection of Stock Signals 
• The Und concept is well-suited for building the bridge to “stocks”. (We referred to 
soil carbon as a general example.) Our notion of risk introduced by the Und concept 
is in line with the soil communities’ (type-I-error) thinking in terms of statistical 
significance. However, in contrast to the soil community, which is typically trying 
to estimate the minimum detectable difference with a specified sample size or the 
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number of measurements needed to detect a specified difference with a specified 
power, we assess risk in terms of true (but unknown) emissions and in relation to 
committed targets, and by how much these are undershot, where the undershooting 
can be corrected to account for the detectability of the targets. 
• Although the detection of uncertain emission changes (emission signals) and stock 
changes (stock signals) is similar, the signal-versus-uncertainty understanding 
differs among the scientific communities concerned. A rigorous attempt has not yet 
been made to unify their understanding and to address this issue. We see a clear 
need for the development of a unified signal-versus-uncertainty understanding 
across “flux” and “stock communities” under the Kyoto Protocol. This task needs to 
be tackled, ideally under the umbrella of the IPCC, and also consider the risk 
associated with not undershooting specified stock targets as well as the detectability 
of these targets. 
Table 19: Summary of results: The four signal detection techniques (CRU, VT, Und, 
Und&VT) applied to Annex I countries. The table is compiled from Tables 
6, B1 and D4 (in Appendices B and D) and lists the countries’ CRUs, their 
normalized VTs as well as their modified emission limitation or reduction 
targets modδ . The latter consider undershooting committed or detectable 
targets to prescribed levels, thus reducing the risk (α  and vα , respectively) 
that the countries’ true emissions in the commitment year/period are above 
the true equivalents of these targets. 
   CRU Concept VT Concept 
Normalized VTs if Countries report 
with ρ = Country 
Group 
Max. Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKPb 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
 
% 2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.9 
2 20 7.0 7.5 0.3 < 1.0 1.9 3.3 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 0.4 1.2 2.2 3.8 
4 20 5.0 5.3 0.5 1.4 2.6 4.6 
5 20 0.0 0.0 infinite 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 2.6 8.1 17.6 42.9 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 0.3 > 1.0 2.2 5.4 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 0.3 0.8 1.8 4.3 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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Table 19: continued. 
  Und Concept Und&VT Concept 
Modified Emission Limitation or 
Reduction Target δmod 
in % for ρ = 
Modified Emission Limitation or 
Reduction Target δmod 
in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and and 
Country 
Group 
Critical 
Target 
δcrit 
% 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
α = 0.0 
α = 0.1 
α = 0.3 
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0 
α = 0.1 
α = 0.3 
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0 
α = 0.1 
α = 0.3 
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0 
α = 0.1 
α = 0.3 
α = 0.5 
av = 0.0 
av = 0.1 
av = 0.3 
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0 
av = 0.1 
av = 0.3 
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0 
av = 0.1 
av = 0.3 
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
1a 
1b 
1c 
1d 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
12.5 
11.6 
9.8 
8.0 
20.8 
18.4 
13.4 
8.0 
32.0
27.7
18.4
8.0 
50.5
43.6
27.7
8.0 
10.2
9.8
8.9
8.0 
14.4 
13.2 
10.7 
8.0 
24.4 
22.4 
18.0 
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
2 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
11.5 
10.6 
8.8 
7.0 
20.0 
17.5 
12.4 
7.0 
31.3
26.9
17.5
7.0 
49.9
43.0
26.9
7.0 
9.3
8.8
7.9
7.0 
13.5 
12.3 
9.7 
7.0 
24.4 
22.4 
18.0 
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
3a 
3b 
3c 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
10.6 
9.7 
7.9 
6.0 
19.1 
16.6 
11.5 
6.0 
30.5
26.1
16.6
6.0 
49.4
42.4
26.1
6.0 
8.3
7.8
6.9
6.0 
13.5 
12.2 
9.7 
7.0 
24.4 
22.4 
18.0 
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
4 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
9.6 
8.7 
6.9 
5.0 
18.3 
15.8 
10.5 
5.0 
29.8
25.4
15.8
5.0 
48.8
41.8
25.4
5.0 
7.3
6.9
5.9
5.0 
13.5 
12.2 
9.7 
7.0 
24.4 
22.4 
18.0 
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
5 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
4.9 
3.9 
2.0 
0.0 
14.0 
11.3 
5.8 
0.0 
26.1
21.4
11.3
0.0 
46.2
38.7
21.4
0.0 
4.9
4.5
3.5
2.6 
14.5 
13.3 
10.8 
8.1 
28.4 
26.5 
22.3 
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
6 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
3.9 
3.0 
1.0 
-1.0 
13.1 
10.4 
4.9 
-1.0 
25.3
20.6
10.4
-1.0 
45.6
38.1
20.6
-1.0 
4.9
4.5
3.5
2.6 
14.5 
13.3 
10.8 
8.1 
28.4 
26.5 
22.3 
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
7 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-2.7 
-3.8  
-5.9 
-8.0 
7.1 
4.2 
-1.7 
-8.0 
20.2
15.1
4.2
-8.0 
41.8
33.8
15.1
-8.0 
-0.4
-0.9
-1.9
-2.9 
14.5 
13.3 
10.8 
8.1 
28.4 
26.5 
22.3 
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
8 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-4.6 
-5.7 
-7.8 
-10.0 
5.3 
2.5 
-3.6 
-10.0 
18.7
13.6
2.5
-10.0 
40.8
32.6
13.6
-10.0 
-2.3
-2.8
-3.8
-4.9 
12.8 
11.5 
8.9 
6.2 
28.4 
26.5 
22.3 
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
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Table 20: This table complements Table 19. It lists the techniques’ major 
characteristics, pros and cons as well as our interpretation of the results. 
Concept Major Characteristics, including Pros and Cons 
Major Findings 
CRU 
Section 3.1 
The CRU concept implicitly addresses the issue of 
signal detection in a temporal context. The emission 
signal is compared with the total uncertainty that 
underlies the emissions in the commitment year/period. 
The uncertainty is treated as statistically independent. 
The CRU concept exhibits an over/ undershooting 
dissimilarity between countries committed to emission 
reduction ( KP 0δ > ) and emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). 
Expecting that Annex I countries exhibit relative 
uncertainties in the range of 5–10% and above rather 
than below, excluding emissions/removals due to 
LUCF, it is virtually impossible for most of the 
countries in groups 1–8 to meet the condition that their 
overall relative uncertainties are smaller than their 
CRUs (
critρ ρ< ). 
VT 
Section 3.2 
The VT concept explicitly addresses the issue of signal 
detection in a temporal context. The emission signal is 
compared with the total uncertainty that underlies the 
emissions in the commitment year/period. The 
uncertainty is treated as statistically independent. 
The VT concept exhibits an over/ undershooting 
dissimilarity between countries committed to emission 
reduction ( KP 0δ > ) and emission limitation ( KP 0δ ≤ ). 
Normalized VTs equal to or smaller than 1 (see green 
fields for emission reduction and orange fields for 
emission limitation) are compatible with the Kyoto 
Protocol, i.e., countries report with 
critρ ρ≤ ; 
normalized VTs greater than 1 (see red fields) are not, 
i.e., countries report with 
critρ ρ> . Expecting that 
Annex I countries exhibit relative uncertainties in the 
range of 5–10% and above rather than below, 
excluding emissions/removals due to LUCF, it is 
virtually impossible for most of the countries in groups 
1–8 to meet the condition  
critρ ρ<  or, equivalently, 
achieve normalized VTs ≤ 1. 
Und 
Section 3.3 
Total uncertainties of base year and commitment 
year/period emissions are combined. (Their 
correlation can only be considered in the 
stochastic generalization of the Und concept.) 
With the help of the combined uncertainty, 
modified emission limitation or reduction targets 
modδ  can be specified, which consider the risk 
that the countries’ true, but unknown, emissions 
are above their limitation or reduction 
commitments agreed upon under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The modified targets depend on the 
undershooting that is needed to reduce this risk 
to a prescribed level. 
As a consequence of arbitrarily agreed-upon, 
nonuniform emission limitation or reduction 
commitments KPδ , a politically unfavorable 
situation arises that is not in line with the spirit 
of the Kyoto Protocol. Varying KPδ  while 
keeping the relative uncertainty ρ and the risk α 
constant exhibits that Annex I countries 
complying with a smaller KPδ  (they exhibit a 
small 
modδ ) are better off than countries that must 
comply with a greater KPδ  (they exhibit a great 
modδ ). 
Toward the development of a unified signal-
versus-uncertainty understanding across “flux” 
and “stock communities” under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Und concept is well-suited for 
building a bridge. Its notion of risk is in line with 
the stock communities’ (type-I-error) thinking in 
terms of statistical significance. 
Expecting that Annex I countries exhibit relative 
uncertainties in the range of 5–10% and above 
rather than below, excluding emissions/removals 
due to LUCF, the modified emission limitation 
or reduction targets 
modδ  of the countries require 
considerable undershooting of their committed 
Kyoto targets if one wants to keep the risk low 
( 0.1α≈ ) that the countries’ emissions in the 
commitment year/period are above these targets 
in terms of true, but unknown, emissions. 
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Table 20: continued. 
Und&VT 
Section 3.4 
The Und&VT concept takes advantage of the 
introduction of risk  as the strength of the Und 
concept and the explicit consideration of time in 
detecting an emission signal as the strength of 
the VT concept. Like in the VT concept, the 
emission signal is compared with the total 
uncertainty, which underlies the emissions in the 
commitment year/period and which is treated as 
statistically independent. 
All modified emission limitation or reduction 
targets 
modδ  are detectable and are thus 
compatible with the Kyoto Protocol. Under 
compliance, countries would report with 
critρ ρ≤  
or, equivalently, with normalized VTs equal to 
or smaller than 1. Emission reduction: No 
correction in the form of an initial or obligatory 
undershooting is necessary in the case of the 
green fields as 
critδ  is KPδ≤ . Emission limitation: 
The concept of an initial or obligatory 
undershooting is unconditionally applied 
although 
critδ  can be KPδ≥  (see orange fields) 
and before detectable reductions that countries 
might have already realized (see light orange 
fields) are considered. 
Expecting that Annex I countries exhibit relative 
uncertainties in the range of 5–10% and above 
rather than below, excluding emissions/removals 
due to LUCF, the countries’ modified emission 
limitation or reduction targets require 
considerable undershooting of their Kyoto-
compatible, but detectable, targets if one wants 
to keep the risk low (
v
0.1α ≈ ) that the countries’ 
emissions in the commitment year/period are 
above these targets in terms of true, but 
unknown, emissions. 
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Acronyms and Nomenclature 
COP Conference of the Parties 
CRU Critical Relative Uncertainty 
C&C Contraction and Convergence 
EU European Union 
DTI Distance-to-Target Indicator 
FCA Full Carbon Accounting 
FF Fossil Fuels 
FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
KP Kyoto Protocol 
KT Kyoto Target 
LUCF Land-Use Change and Forestry 
MDD Minimum Detectable Difference 
MS Member State 
P Probability 
PCA Partial Carbon Accounting 
PDF Probability Distribution Function 
RC Reduction Commitment 
RME Reliable Minimum Estimate 
U Uncertainty 
Und Undershooting 
Und&VT Undershooting and Verification Time 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
VT Verification Time 
crit critical 
low lower 
n.d. not defined 
mod modified 
t true 
upp upper 
v verifiable 
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ISO Country Code 
AT Austria 
AU Australia 
BE Belgium 
BG Bulgaria 
CA Canada 
CH Switzerland 
CZ Czech Republic 
DE Germany 
DK Denmark 
EC European Community 
EE Estonia 
ES Spain 
FI Finland 
FR France 
GR Greece 
HR Croatia 
HU Hungary 
IE Ireland 
IS Iceland 
IT Italy 
JP Japan 
LI Liechtenstein 
LT Lithuania 
LU Luxembourg 
LV Latvia 
MC Monaco 
NL Netherlands 
NO Norway 
NZ New Zealand 
PL Poland 
PT Portugal 
RO Romania 
RU Russian Federation 
SE Sweden 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovak Republic 
UA Ukraine 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
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Appendix A: A Note to Sections 3.1 and 3.2 on 
the Independence of Uncertainties 
The CRU (Section 3.1) as well as the VT concept (Section 3.2) require further 
discussion as to how the emission signal is linked with uncertainty (see inequalities (3) 
and (7)) and because the notion of statistical independence is used (see inequality (8)). 
To elucidate, we distinguish between GHG fluxes, carbon stocks and carbon stock 
changes explicitly interpreted as net fluxes: 
GHG Fluxes 
Assume that the emissions (xi) of a specific GHG source have been derived at times ti 
with the knowledge of the respective activity (Ai) and corresponding emission factor 
(EFi). Emission calculations have been carried out at t1 and t2 (i = 1, 2), where we 
assume that the activities A1 and A2 have been assessed independently, while our 
knowledge of the emission factor has not changed, which can be considered typical for 
inventorying GHG emissions.29 Thus, we can write for the emissions and the difference 
in emissions: 
1 1x A EF=  , 2 2x A EF=  (A1), (A2) 
( )2 1 2 1 2x : x x A A EF∆ = − = −  , (A3a,b) 
and for their uncertainties following the law of uncertainty (error) propagation: 
2 2 2 2 2
1 A 1 EF1
EF Aε ε ε= +    ⇔   
22 2
A1 1 EF
2 2 2
1 1x A EF
εε ε
= +  (A4), (A5) 
2 2 2 2 2
2 A 2 EF2
EF Aε ε ε= +    ⇔   
22 2
A2 2 EF
2 2 2
2 2x A EF
εε ε
= +  (A6), (A7) 
( ) ( )22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2x,2 A A 1 2 EF 1 2 1 2 EF1 2EF A A 2A Aε ε ε ε ε ε ε∆ = + + − = + −  , (A8a,b) 
or ( 1 2A A≠ ): 
( )
2 22 2
A Ax,2 1 2 EF
22 2
1 2
x EFA A
ε εε ε∆ += +∆ −  . (A9) 
                                                 
29
 In this context, two remarks need to be made: (1) in general, the emission assessments at t1 and t2 are 
singular (i.e., they cannot be repeated as frequently as desired) and reflect the best expert knowledge 
available; and (2) a number of activities may also be dependent (or correlated) at t1 and t2 as the same 
activity data may be used to estimate more than one emission source (e.g., in the agricultural sector) or 
pollutant (e.g., in the case of energy emissions). 
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To graphically visualize the emissions ix  (equations (A1) and (A2)) and the absolute 
change in emissions ix∆  (equation (A3)) in the context of their uncertainties, equation 
(A8) needs to be developed further. In accordance with Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we specify 
the ratio of activities with the help of KPδ : 
2 2
KP
1 1
x A 1
x A
δ= = −  (A10), (2) 
and consider the case 2 2 2 2A i EFiEF Aε ε<<  or, equivalently, 
2 2
Ai EF
2 2
iA EF
ε ε
<<  (i = 1, 2) (see 
also Table A1). Here, we refer to a situation that we consider typical or close to typical 
for industrialized Annex I countries. CO2 activities related to the combustion of fossil 
fuels (including fugitive emissions) are less precisely known than their corresponding 
emission factors. However, it is the opposite situation if we also consider CH4 and N2O 
resulting from fossil fuel combustion activities (including fugitive emissions) and 
industrial processes, as well as from natural sources. For these gases, activities are 
typically known more precisely than their corresponding emission factors. We consider 
the latter situation also representative if CO2, CH4 and N2O are combined and 
aggregated in the form of CO2-equivalent emissions (Winiwarter, 2004). Thus: 
( )
22 2 2 2 2 2 2
x,2 1 EF 2 EF 1 2 EF 1 2 EFA A 2A A A Aε ε ε ε ε∆ ≈ + − = −  , (A11a,b) 
from which we can derive with the help of equations (A10) and (2) 
( )( )
22 2 2 2 2 2
x,2 KP 1 EF KP 1 11 1 Aε δ ε δ ε ε∆ ≈ − − ≈ <  (A12a,b), (A13) 
and/or 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2KP
x,2 2 EF 2 2
KP KP
1 1 A
1 1
δε ε ε εδ δ∆
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟≈ − ≈ <⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (A14a,b), (A15) 
for KPδ  ranging between –0.1 and 0.08 (see, e.g., Table 5). 
Moreover, the uncertainty 2 x,2ε∆  can be assessed in relation to 1 2 KP 1x x xδ− =  (confer 
equation (2)). For instance, from approximation (A12b) in combination with equation 
(1a) we can conclude that 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
x,2 KP 1 KP 1 KP 1x xε δ ε δ ρ δ∆ ≈ = <  (A12b,c), (A16) 
if 2 1ρ ≤  (see also Table A1).30 
                                                 
30
 Making use of approximation (A14b) in combination with equations (1b) and (2) leads to the same 
result. 
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Table A1: Assessment of the uncertainty 2 x,2ε∆  in relation to 21ε , 22ε  and 
1 2 KP 1x x xδ− = . 
Case Approximation of 2
x,2ε∆  
(cf. equation (A8)) 
Comparison of 2
x,2ε∆  with 1 2 KP 1x x xδ− =  
(cf. equation (2)) 
2 2 2
x,2 KP 1ε δ ε∆ ≈  
2 2
x,2 1ε ε∆ ≤  for 2K P 1δ ≤  
2 2
Ai EF
2 2
iA EF
ε ε
<<  
2
2 2KP
x,2 2
KP1
δε εδ∆
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟≈ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ −⎝ ⎠  
2 2
x,2 2ε ε∆ ≤  for KP 12δ ≤  
22
x,2 1 2x xε∆ ≤ −  for 2 1ρ ≤  
 
( )2 2 2x,2 KP KP 11ε δ δ ε∆ ≈ − +  
2 2
x,2 1ε ε∆ ≤  for KP0 1δ≤ ≤  
2 2
x,2 1ε ε∆ >  for KP 0δ < , KP 1δ >  
2 2
Ai EF
2 2
iA EF
ε ε≈  
( )
2
2 2KP KP
x,2 22
KP
1
1
δ δε εδ∆
− +≈ −  
2 2
x,2 2ε ε∆ ≤  for KP 0δ ≤  
2 2
x,2 2ε ε∆ >  for KP 0δ >  
 
 
22
x,2 1 2x xε∆ ≤ −  for 
2
2 KP
2
KP KP1
δρ δ δ≤ − +  
KPδ  
in % ( ){ }
0.5
2 2
KP KP KP1δ δ δ− +  
in % 
8.0 8.3 
7.0 7.2 
6.0 6.2 
5.0 5.1 
0.0 0.0 
-1.0 1.0 
-8.0 7.7 
-10.0 9.5 
 
2 2 2
x,2 1 2ε ε ε∆ ≈ +  
2 2
x,2 1ε ε∆ ≥  for any KPδ  
2 2
Ai EF
2 2
iA EF
ε ε
>>  
2 2 2
x,2 1 2ε ε ε∆ ≈ +  
2 2
x,2 2ε ε∆ ≥  for any KPδ  
 
 
 
 
 
22
x,2 1 2x xε∆ ≤ −  for 
( )
2
2 KP
2
KP1 1
δρ δ≤ + −  
KPδ  
in % ( )( ){ }
0.5
22
KP KP1 1δ δ+ −  
in % 
8.0 5.9 
7.0 5.1 
6.0 4.4 
5.0 3.6 
0.0 0.0 
-1.0 0.7 
-8.0 5.4 
-10.0 6.7 
 
Figure A1 illustrates, in a simplified fashion, for the case 
2
Ai EF
2 2
iA EF
ε ε
<<  the emissions ix  
(equations (A1) and (A2)) and the absolute change in emissions ix∆  (equation (A3)) 
as well as their uncertainties iε  and x,iε∆  (equations (A4), (A6) and (A8)) within a 
temporal context.31 Both the emissions and the (absolute) emission signal are shown at 
                                                 
31
 Note that xε∆  at t1 is zero (i.e., x,1 0ε∆ = ). This can be shown (but not done here) with the help of the 
general law of uncertainty propagation. 
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t1 and t2. They are surrounded by their respective uncertainties, which ― when 
connected (in line with preparatory signal detection) by straight lines ― provide 
uncertainty bands. 
 
Figure A1: a) Emissions ix  and b) (absolute) emission signal ix∆  at ti, together with 
their respective uncertainties iε  and x,iε∆  (i =1, 2). To address the question 
of when the emission signal outstrips uncertainty, the emission signal is 
compared with the uncertainty that underlies the emissions, not the 
emission signal (see red link). In the figure (without restricting generality): 
critρ ρ=  (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
However, the equations underlying Figure A1 do not yet reflect this temporal context. 
They do not yet permit addressing the issue of signal detection, i.e., the question of 
when an emission signal outstrips uncertainty. To overcome this fundamental 
shortcoming, we need to make the step from a one or one-by-one to a (here) two-points-
in-time view (i.e., make use of the dynamics of the emissions or the emission signal), 
and thus introduce time. The CRU as well as the VT concept make this step ― the CRU 
concept implicitly, the VT concept explicitly. In these concepts, the emission signal is 
compared with the uncertainty that underlies the emissions, not the emission signal (see, 
e.g., inequality (7)): 
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( ) ( )2 2x t tε∆ >  ; (7) 
under the VT concept ( )2x t∆  is then expressed temporally by extracting the (absolute) 
rate of change of the emission signal (see inequality (8)). (Under the CRU concept 
inequality (7) is assumed to be fulfilled at t2.) In inequality (7), we treat ( )i itε ε=  as 
statistically independent (similar to white noise). That is, in the commitment year/period 
t2 we ask for the total uncertainty at that point in time, not whether or not the total 
uncertainty at t2 can be decreased, e.g., on the basis of correlative techniques (i.e., our 
emission and uncertainty knowledge at t1). This is in accordance with the concept of 
bottom up–top down verification (see Box 1 in Section 2.3), which strongly suggests 
that it is the total uncertainty that matters as long as we are still searching for the 
accurate mean emission values. 
Carbon Stocks 
To potentially also deal with carbon stocks under the CRU as well as the VT concept, 
the issue of physical units and the issue of correlation have to be addressed. 
(a) The Issue of Physical Units. So far, both the CRU concept and the VT concept had 
been applied at the level of fluxes and their uncertainties. However, they can 
formally also be applied at the level of stocks and their uncertainties. To these ends, 
equations (3) and (7) as well as their successor equations only need to be shifted in 
terms of physical units, i.e., from 1Mt C yr−  to Mt C , as shown in Table A2. 
(b) The Issue of Correlation. Measurements of stocks might be correlated over time, 
e.g., if forests are inventoried using permanent plots or if soils are resampled in a 
paired sample mode.32 Here, the same argument is put forward as under the flux 
approach above: In order to temporally detect a stock signal (instead of an emission 
signal) ― again, in accordance with the concept of bottom up–top down verification 
― the stock signal has to be linked with the uncertainty, which underlies the stock 
measurements (not the stock signal) and which is also treated as statistically 
independent. This is just the characteristic modus of how the CRU and the VT 
concept address the issue of detecting emission and/or stock signals over time. This 
mere investigation of when a stock signal has outstripped its underlying total 
uncertainty is in contrast to the case below where a carbon stock change is the 
mathematical object to be explicitly dealt with, e.g., when interpreted as a net flux in 
accordance with the principle of conservation of matter. This mathematical 
interpretation requires considering the issue of correlation. 
 
                                                 
32
 However, soil scientists concomitantly point out that, as variability among samples can be high even at 
small spatial scales, the statistical concept of paired samples, even if collected only centimeters apart, 
cannot be reliably employed (Shoch et al., 2003). 
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Table A2: CRU and VT concept: The issue of physical units in dependence of the 
approach followed (flux or a stock approach). 
Equation Quantity Flux Approach 
Units 
Stock Approach 
Units 
(3) 
1 2x x−  1Mt C yr−  Mt C  
 2ε  1Mt C yr−  Mt C  
(7) ( )2x t∆  1Mt C yr−  Mt C  
 ( )2tε  1Mt C yr−  Mt C  
(9) t∆  yr  yr  
 
t1
dx
dt
 
1Mt C yr
yr
−
 
Mt C
yr
 
 ( )1tε  1Mt C yr−  Mt C  
 
t1
d
dt
ε⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠  
1Mt C yr
yr
−
 
Mt C
yr
 
Carbon Stock Changes Explicitly Interpreted as Net Fluxes 
Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that human activities related to 
LUCF since 1990 can also be used to meet 2008–2012 commitments (see Section 2.2). 
The net changes in carbon emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from 
these activities have to be measured as changes in carbon stocks either between 2012 
and 2008 or 2008/12 and 1990 (FCCC, 1998:Articles 3.3, 3.4; 1999:Decision 9/CP.4; 
2002:Annex to Draft decision -/CMP.1). However, considering a carbon stock at two 
points in time and interpreting its change as a net flux permits us to only derive one net 
flux value as well as only one uncertainty value. As a consequence, the issue of 
temporal signal detection cannot be addressed. (Nevertheless, in the case that carbon 
stock estimates are available at more than two points in time, carbon stock changes that 
are interpreted as net fluxes can also be put into a temporal context as described above.) 
To conclude, it is recalled that the way of how both the CRU concept and the VT 
concept assess uncertainty differs from that recommended by the IPCC and envisaged 
under the Kyoto Protocol (see Section 2.3). The CRU and VT concepts assess 
uncertainty in connection with the temporal detection of an emission signal; the IPCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol do not do this. 
 
 
 
 72
Appendix B: A Note to Section 3.3 on the Not 
Approximated Undershooting Concept 
In this appendix we apply the Und concept without approximations. To these ends, we 
write inequality (26a) in the form 
( )
( )
( )
2
KP mod
1
1 1 2x 1 1
x 1 1 2
α ρδ δα ρ
− −≤ − = −
+ −  . (26a), (B1) 
Thus, the modified emission limitation or reduction target modδ  is given by: 
( )
( )
( )mod KP
1 1 2
1 1
1 1 2
α ρδ δ α ρ
− −
= − −
+ −  , (B2) 
where modδ  is still linked with U  according to 
mod KP Uδ δ= +  . (B3) 
Resolving for U : 
( )
( )
( )KP
1 2
U 2 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−
= −
+ −  . (B4) 
Equation (B2) allows calculating the accurate modified emission limitation or reduction 
targets modδ  and equation (B4) the accurate undershooting U  contained in modδ  for all 
Annex 1 countries. Tables B1 and B2 lists their modδ  and U  values, where the “ t ,2x -
greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is specified, like in Tables 7 and 8 to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 
0.5. 
The comparison with Tables 7 and 8 shows (1) that modδ  and U  are reasonably well 
approximated over the entire range of KPδ  values except for those combinations, in 
which ρ exhibits values in the order of 0.15 and beyond and α approaches zero; and (2) 
that our conclusions of Section 3.3 are not impaired. 
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Table B1: The Und concept (equation (B2)) applied to Annex I countries. The table 
lists modified emission limitation or reduction targets modδ  for all Annex 1 
countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is specified to 
be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further explanations confer to the caption of Table 
7. 
Modified Emission Limitation 
or Reduction Targets δmod 
in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and 
Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKPb 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
12.5
11.6
9.8
8.0 
20.8
18.4
13.4
8.0 
32.0
27.7
18.4
8.0 
50.5
43.6
27.7
8.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
11.5
10.6
8.8
7.0 
20.0
17.5
12.4
7.0 
31.3
26.9
17.5
7.0 
49.9
43.0
26.9
7.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
10.6
9.7
7.9
6.0 
19.1
16.6
11.5
6.0 
30.5
26.1
16.6
6.0 
49.4
42.4
26.1
6.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
9.6
8.7
6.9
5.0 
18.3
15.8
10.5
5.0 
29.8
25.4
15.8
5.0 
48.8
41.8
25.4
5.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
8.7
7.8
5.9
4.0 
17.4
14.9
9.6
4.0 
29.0
24.6
14.9
4.0 
48.3
41.2
24.6
4.0 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 
7.7
6.8
4.9
3.0 
16.5
14.0
8.7
3.0 
28.3
23.8
14.0
3.0 
47.8
40.5
23.8
3.0 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 
6.8
5.8
3.9
2.0 
15.7
13.1
7.7
2.0 
27.6
23.0
13.1
2.0 
47.2
39.9
23.0
2.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
5.8
4.9
3.0
1.0 
14.8
12.2
6.8
1.0 
26.8
22.2
12.2
1.0 
46.7
39.3
22.2
1.0 
See Und concept (Table 7). 
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Table B1: continued. 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
4.9
3.9
2.0
0.0 
14.0
11.3
5.8
0.0 
26.1
21.4
11.3
0.0 
46.2
38.7
21.4
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
3.9
3.0
1.0
-1.0 
13.1
10.4
4.9
-1.0 
25.3
20.6
10.4
-1.0 
45.6
38.1
20.6
-1.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
3.0
2.0
0.0
-2.0 
12.2
9.5
3.9
-2.0 
24.6
19.9
9.5
-2.0 
45.1
37.5
19.9
-2.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
2.0
1.0
-1.0
-3.0 
11.4
8.7
3.0
-3.0 
23.9
19.1
8.7
-3.0 
44.5
36.9
19.1
-3.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
1.1
0.1
-1.9
-4.0 
10.5
7.8
2.1
-4.0 
23.1
18.3
7.8
-4.0 
44.0
36.3
18.3
-4.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
0.1
-0.9
-2.9
-5.0 
9.7
6.9
1.1
-5.0 
22.4
17.5
6.9
-5.0 
43.5
35.6
17.5
-5.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
-0.8
-1.8
-3.9
-6.0 
8.8
6.0
0.2
-6.0 
21.7
16.7
6.0
-6.0 
42.9
35.0
16.7
-6.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
-1.8
-2.8
-4.9
-7.0 
7.9
5.1
-0.8
-7.0 
20.9
15.9
5.1
-7.0 
42.4
34.4
15.9
-7.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
-2.7
-3.8 
-5.9
-8.0 
7.1
4.2
-1.7
-8.0 
20.2
15.1
4.2
-8.0 
41.8
33.8
15.1
-8.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
-3.7
-4.7
-6.8
-9.0 
6.2
3.3
-2.7
-9.0 
19.4
14.4
3.3
-9.0 
41.3
33.2
14.4
-9.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
-4.6
-5.7
-7.8
-10.0 
5.3
2.5
-3.6
-10.0 
18.7
13.6
2.5
-10.0 
40.8
32.6
13.6
-10.0 
See Und concept (Table 7). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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Table B2: The Und concept (equation (B4)) applied to Annex I countries. The table 
lists the undershooting U  contained in the modified emission limitation and 
reduction targets modδ  listed in Table B1, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-
( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further 
explanations confer to the caption of Table 7. 
Undershooting U in %  
for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and 
Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKPb 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
4.5
3.6
1.8
0.0 
12.8
10.4
5.4
0.0 
24.0
19.7
10.4
0.0 
42.5
35.6
19.7
0.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
4.5
3.6
1.8
0.0 
13.0
10.5
5.4
0.0 
24.3
19.9
10.5
0.0 
42.9
36.0
19.9
0.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
4.6
3.7
1.9
0.0 
13.1
10.6
5.5
0.0 
24.5
20.1
10.6
0.0 
43.4
36.4
20.1
0.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
4.6
3.7
1.9
0.0 
13.3
10.8
5.5
0.0 
24.8
20.4
10.8
0.0 
43.8
36.8
20.4
0.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
4.7
3.8
1.9
0.0 
13.4
10.9
5.6
0.0 
25.0
20.6
10.9
0.0 
44.3
37.2
20.6
0.0 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 
4.7
3.8
1.9
0.0 
13.5
11.0
5.7
0.0 
25.3
20.8
11.0
0.0 
44.8
37.5
20.8
0.0 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 
4.8
3.8
1.9
0.0 
13.7
11.1
5.7
0.0 
25.6
21.0
11.1
0.0 
45.2
37.9
21.0
0.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
4.8
3.9
2.0
0.0 
13.8
11.2
5.8
0.0 
25.8
21.2
11.2
0.0 
45.7
38.3
21.2
0.0 
See Und concept (Table 8). 
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Table B2: continued. 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
4.9
3.9
2.0
0.0 
14.0
11.3
5.8
0.0 
26.1
21.4
11.3
0.0 
46.2
38.7
21.4
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
4.9
4.0
2.0
0.0 
14.1
11.4
5.9
0.0 
26.3
21.6
11.4
0.0 
46.6
39.1
21.6
0.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
5.0
4.0
2.0
0.0 
14.2
11.5
5.9
0.0 
26.6
21.9
11.5
0.0 
47.1
39.5
21.9
0.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
5.0
4.0
2.0
0.0 
14.4
11.7
6.0
0.0 
26.9
22.1
11.7
0.0 
47.5
39.9
22.1
0.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
5.1
4.1
2.1
0.0 
14.5
11.8
6.1
0.0 
27.1
22.3
11.8
0.0 
48.0
40.3
22.3
0.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
5.1
4.1
2.1
0.0 
14.7
11.9
6.1
0.0 
27.4
22.5
11.9
0.0 
48.5
40.6
22.5
0.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
5.2
4.2
2.1
0.0 
14.8
12.0
6.2
0.0 
27.7
22.7
12.0
0.0 
48.9
41.0
22.7
0.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
5.2
4.2
2.1
0.0 
14.9
12.1
6.2
0.0 
27.9
22.9
12.1
0.0 
49.4
41.4
22.9
0.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
5.3
4.2 
2.1
0.0 
15.1
12.2
6.3
0.0 
28.2
23.1
12.2
0.0 
49.8
41.8
23.1
0.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
5.3
4.3
2.2
0.0 
15.2
12.3
6.3
0.0 
28.4
23.4
12.3
0.0 
50.3
42.2
23.4
0.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
5.4
4.3
2.2
0.0 
15.3
12.5
6.4
0.0 
28.7
23.6
12.5
0.0 
50.8
42.6
23.6
0.0 
See Und concept (Table 8). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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Appendix C: A Note to Section 3.3 on the Stochastic 
Generalization of the Undershooting Concept 
The Und concept can be generalized stochastically with respect to both GHG fluxes and 
carbon stocks. In this note, we explain in more general terms the conditions underlying 
the generalization of the Und concept and its notion of risk. We found building this 
interdisciplinary bridge necessary when communicating with experts from various 
scientific communities involved in monitoring and estimating GHG fluxes and carbon 
stocks over time. 
GHG Fluxes 
In general, emission estimates of large emitters (countries, sectors, etc.) are unique in 
the sense that they can be carried out independently from each other only once in a 
certain manner for a given point in time. They cannot be repeatedly realized as 
specified. In practice, repetitions are carried out if improved knowledge becomes 
available that is used as input for an emission estimate, e.g., more correct activity data 
or emission factors. As a consequence, improved emission estimates cannot be 
considered as independent repetitions of the initial estimate. 
It is common practice to interpret a singular emission estimate as the best estimate that 
is identical, or sufficiently close, to the mean value of a hypothetical probability 
distribution function (PDF) that one would find if emission estimates could be 
repeatedly realized independently of each other. In addition, experts try to also specify 
the uncertainty that surrounds this mean emission estimate (which is the situation 
underlying Appendix A) as well as the type of PDF which, they believe, reflects this 
emission estimate best. Typically, PDFs are chosen to be normal. However, in some 
cases, they are also assumed to be uniform and even lognormal or triangular (see, e.g., 
Winiwarter and Orthofer, 2000:Table 6; Winiwarter and Rypdal, 2001:Table 2). 
Nahorski et al. (2003) have generalized the Und concept stochastically with respect to 
emissions. The authors also specify the PDF that is assumed to underlie ix  (i = 1, 2).  
The true (but unknown) emissions t ,ix  are assumed to satisfy 
( )i t ,iE x x=  , (C1) 
where ( )iE x  denotes the expectation value of the random variable ix  with iε  as its 
(finite) standard deviation. With a view on inequalities (19)–(22), the combined PDF of 
the random variable ( ){ }KP 1 21 x xδ− −  is considered. This PDF can be arbitrary 
provided it exhibits ( ){ }KP t,1 t,21 x xδ− −  as its median. The risk α that 
( ){ }KP 1 21 x xδ− −  is equal to or greater than ( ){ }KP t,1 t ,2 1 121 x x q αδ ε−− − + , or, 
alternatively, the standardized difference ( )( ) ( )( ){ }KP 1 2 KP t,1 t ,21 x x 1 x xδ δ− − − − −  is 
equal to or greater than 1q α− , can be expressed as the probability (P) of 
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( ){ } ( ){ }KP 1 2 KP t,1 t,2
1
12
1 x x 1 x x
P q α
δ δ αε −
⎛ ⎞− − − − − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ≥ =⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 , (C2) 
where ( )12 1 2f ,ε ε ε=  is the standard deviation of the random variable ( ){ }KP 1 21 x xδ− −  
( 1ε  and 2ε  can correlate); 1q α−  is the ( )th1 α−  quantile of the PDF of the corresponding 
standardized variable; and 0 0.5α≤ ≤ . Due to the standardization, 0.5q 0= . Equation 
(C2) contains the condition that needs to be satisfied with respect to α: 
( ) ( ){ }2 KP 1 t,2 KP t,1 1 12x 1 x x 1 x q αδ δ ε−≤ − + − − −  . (C3) 
To study the case ( )t ,2 KP t,1x 1 x 0δ− − ≥  (cf. Section 3.3), it is sufficient to consider 
( )t ,2 KP t,1x 1 x 0δ− − = , i.e., inequality 
( )2 KP 1 1 12x 1 x q αδ ε−≤ − −  , (C4a) 
because inequality (C4a) implies inequality (C3). All of the terms of inequality (C4a) 
are known or can be determined. It permits calculating the risk α associated with 
( )t ,2 KP t,1x 1 x 0δ− − ≥ . Similar to the Und concept based on interval uncertainties, 
inequality (C4a) or 
( )2 KP 1 1 12x 1 x q αδ ε−− − ≤−  (C4b) 
also requires ( )2 KP 1Dx x 1 x 0δ= − − ≤ . 
Carbon Stocks 
Here, we refer to soil carbon as a general example. For soil or non-forest vegetation, in 
contrast to forests, the same soil or plant sample cannot be monitored over time. Instead, 
on each sample collection, the sampled unit is destroyed for the analysis of its relevant 
components. Here, we interpret ix  as the arithmetic mean over a number of soil carbon 
measurements (collectively called a sample in statistics) within a given spatial unit at 
time ti and t ,ix  as the unknown expectation value of the population from which the 
sample came (i = 1, 2). 
Soil scientists typically apply the t statistics as their samples are limited (consisting of 
less than 30 measurements per spatial unit) and the populations from which they came 
can be assumed to be normally distributed. In Table C1, we present a general overview 
on typical t statistical applications in soil sciences. The generalized Und concept 
outlined above is in accordance with the concept of statistical significance in 
combination with the testing of hypotheses. In the particular case here, it is the 
accordance with the two-(independent or dependent) samples t test (where the “t1 
sample” is multiplied with ( )KP1 δ− ) to test the null hypothesis that the difference of 
two population means is = 0 or ≤ 0. (That is, the alternate hypotheses are that this 
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difference is ≠ or > 0.)  The risk α addressed by the generalized Und concept is identical 
with the situation that the test comes to a significant result (rejection of the null 
hypothesis), commonly also called type I error. 
Table C1: General overview on typical t statistical applications in soil sciences. 
Sources: Dawkins (1957); Sokal and Rohlf (1981); MacDicken (1997); 
Bleymüller et al. (1998); Zar (1999); Shoch et al. (2003). 
Sampling Available at 
Applied t Statistics 
t1 t2 
Issues Addressed 
in the t Test Modus 
9 
 1.  Estimating the confidence intervals 
for the population mean, the 
minimum value of which is also 
referred to as reliable minimum 
estimate (RME). 
One-sample t test 
  2.  Estimating the minimum detectable 
difference (MDD) with a sample of 
specified size, or the number of 
measurements needed to detect a 
specified difference with a specified 
power. 9 9 1.  Estimating the confidence interval 
for the difference of two population 
means. A modification is the 
quantification of the (two-sided) 
RME. 
Two-independent samples 
t test (unpaired sampling) 
  2.   Testing the null hypothesis that the 
difference of two population means is 
= 0 or ≤ 0. (To avoid the Behrens-
Fisher problem, the variances of the 
two populations are assumed to be 
equal.)  9 9 1.  Quantifying the (two-sided) RME. Two-dependent samples t 
test (paired sampling)32  
  2.  Testing the null hypothesis that the 
difference of two population means is 
= 0 or ≤ 0. 
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Appendix D: A Note to Section 3.4 on the Not Approximated 
Undershooting–Verification Time Concept 
In this appendix we apply the Und&VT concept without approximations. 
(I) Initial or Obligatory Undershooting for δKP > 0  
Case 1: δcrit ≤ δKP. The emission reduction commitments of the Annex I countries are 
detectable at t2. An initial or obligatory undershooting does not need to be introduced. 
Case 2: δcrit > δKP. We compare inequality (43a) with reference to KPδ : 
( )
( )
2
KP mod
1
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ≤ − = −+ −  , (43a), (B1) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod KP KP
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ= − − = ++ −  (D1), (B3) 
 ( )
( )
( )KP
1 2
U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−
= −
+ −  ; (D2) 
and inequality (45a) with reference to critδ : 
( )
( )
2
crit mod
1 v
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ≤ − = −+ −  , (45a), (B1) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod crit KP vv
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ= − − = ++ −  (D3a,b) 
 ( )
( )
( )
v
v Gap crit
v
1 2
U U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−
= + −
+ −  (D4) 
and critδ  and GapU  are given, as before, by equations (32a) and (42b), respectively. 
Thus: 
( )
( )mod crit v
11 1
1 1 2
δ δ α ρ− = − + −  . (D5) 
Solving for vα , we find  
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( )
mod crit
v
mod
1 1
2 1
δ δα δ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , (D6) 
where modδ  is given by equation (D1). 
(II) Initial or Obligatory Undershooting for δKP ≤ 0  
Case 3: δcrit < δKP. We compare inequality (43a) with reference to KPδ  (as above) and 
inequality (50a) with reference to critδ− : 
( )
( )
2
crit mod
1 v
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ≤ + = −+ −  , (50a), (B1) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod crit KP vv
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ= − + = ++ −  (D7a,b) 
 ( )
( )
( )
v
v Gap crit
v
1 2
U U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−
= + +
+ −  (D8) 
and critδ  and GapU  are given, as before, by equations (32b) and (52), respectively. Thus: 
( )
( )mod crit v
11 1
1 1 2
δ δ α ρ− = + + −  . (D9) 
Solving for vα , we find  
( )
mod crit
v
mod
1 1
2 1
δ δα δ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪+⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , (D10) 
where modδ  is given by equation (D1). However, as the intervals 
( )KP KP KP, 1 1
ρδ δ δ ρ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ −⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
 and ( )crit crit crit, 1 1
ρδ δ δ ρ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− − + +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
 do not overlap, 
corresponding risks α  ↔ vα  cannot be determined.33 
                                                 
33
 The comparison of Tables D1 and D4 for 
crit KPδ δ<  (Case 3) shows that ( )( )modį equation D1 : α 0=  is 
always smaller than ( )( )mod vį Case 3 : equation D7a : α 0.5=  for all listed values of KPδ  and ρ . 
Mathematically, an overlap of intervals would require 
( )( ) ( )( )mod mod vį equation D1 : α 0 į Case 3 : equation D7a : α 0.5= ≥ =  or, alternatively (after making use 
of equations (D1), (D7a) and (32b)), ( ) 2KP crit2 1δ ρ δ≥ − . This is not possible because KP 0δ ≤  and the right 
sight 0>  for 1ρ<  . 
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Case 4: δcrit ≥ δKP. We compare inequality (43a) with reference to KPδ  (as above) and 
inequality (55a) with reference to crit KP crit2δ δ δ′− = − : 
( )
( )
2
crit mod
1 v
x 11 1
x 1 1 2
δ δα ρ′≤ + = −+ −  , (55a), (B1) 
where 
 ( )
( )mod crit KP vv
11 1 U
1 1 2
δ δ δα ρ′= − + = ++ −  (D11a,b) 
 ( )
( )
( )
v
v Gap crit
v
1 2
U U 1
1 1 2
α ρδ α ρ
−′= + +
+ −  (D12) 
and critδ , GapU  and critδ ′  are given, as before, by equations (32b), (57) and (58), 
respectively. Thus: 
( )
( )mod crit v
11 1
1 1 2
δ δ α ρ′− = + + −  . (D13) 
Solving for vα , we find  
( )
mod crit
v
mod
1 1
2 1
δ δα δ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪′+⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , (D14) 
where modδ  is given by equation (D1). Again, as the intervals ( )KP KP KP, 1 1
ρδ δ δ ρ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ −⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
 
and ( )crit crit crit, 1 1
ρδ δ δ ρ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥′ ′ ′− − + +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
 do not overlap, corresponding risks α  ↔ vα  cannot 
be determined.34 
The comparison with Tables 9, 10 and 12 to 14 shows (1) that modδ  and U , vα , and 
modδ  and vU  are reasonably well approximated over the entire range of KPδ  values 
except for those combinations, in which ρ exhibits values in the order of 0.15 and 
beyond and α approaches zero; and (2) that our conclusions of Section 3.4 are not 
impaired. 
                                                 
34
 The comparison of Tables 15 and 17 for 
crit KPį į≥  (Case 4) shows that ( )( )modį equation D1 : α 0=  is 
always smaller than ( )mod vį Case 4 : equation (D11a) : α 0.5=  for all listed values of KPδ  and ρ . 
Mathematically, an overlap of intervals would require 
( )( ) ( )( )mod mod vį equation D1 : α 0 į Case 4 : equation D11a : α 0.5= ≥ =  or, alternatively (after making use 
of equations (D1), (D11a),(58), and (32b)), KP
1 3
1
ρδ ρ
+≥ − . This is not in accordance with reality because 
KPδ  would have to be 1≥ , the smallest value that the term on the right can take on for 0ρ =  ( 1ρ< ). 
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Table D1: The Und part of the Und&VT concept (equation (D1)) applied to Annex I 
countries. The table lists modified emission limitation or reduction targets 
modδ  for all Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” 
risk α  is specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For further explanations confer 
to the captions of Tables 9 and 15. 
Modified Emission Limitation 
or Reduction Target δmod 
in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and 
Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKPb 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
10.2
9.8
8.9
8.0 
14.4
13.2
10.7
8.0 
20.0
17.9
13.2
8.0 
29.2
25.8
17.9
8.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
9.3
8.8
7.9
7.0 
13.5
12.3
9.7
7.0 
19.1
17.0
12.3
7.0 
28.5
25.0
17.0
7.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
8.3
7.8
6.9
6.0 
12.6
11.3
8.7
6.0 
18.3
16.1
11.3
6.0 
27.7
24.2
16.1
6.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
7.3
6.9
5.9
5.0 
11.6
10.4
7.8
5.0 
17.4
15.2
10.4
5.0 
26.9
23.4
15.2
5.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
6.3
5.9
5.0
4.0 
10.7
9.4
6.8
4.0 
16.5
14.3
9.4
4.0 
26.2
22.6
14.3
4.0 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 
5.4
4.9
4.0
3.0 
9.8
8.5
5.8
3.0 
15.7
13.4
8.5
3.0 
25.4
21.8
13.4
3.0 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 
4.4
3.9
3.0
2.0 
8.8
7.5
4.9
2.0 
14.8
12.5
7.5
2.0 
24.6
21.0
12.5
2.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
3.4
2.9
2.0
1.0 
7.9
6.6
3.9
1.0 
13.9
11.6
6.6
1.0 
23.8
20.2
11.6
1.0 
See Und&VT concept 
(Table 9).  
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Table D1: continued. 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
2.4
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.0
5.7
2.9
0.0 
13.0
10.7
5.7
0.0 
23.1
19.4
10.7
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
1.5
1.0
0.0
-1.0 
6.0
4.7
1.9
-1.0 
12.2
9.8
4.7
-1.0 
22.3
18.5
9.8
-1.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
0.5
0.0
-1.0
-2.0 
5.1
3.8
1.0
-2.0 
11.3
8.9
3.8
-2.0 
21.5
17.7
8.9
-2.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
-0.5
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0 
4.2
2.8
0.0
-3.0 
10.4
8.0
2.8
-3.0 
20.8
16.9
8.0
-3.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
-1.5
-2.0
-3.0
-4.0 
3.3
1.9
-1.0
-4.0 
9.6
7.1
1.9
-4.0 
20.0
16.1
7.1
-4.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
-2.4
-2.9
-4.0
-5.0 
2.3
0.9
-1.9
-5.0 
8.7
6.3
0.9
-5.0 
19.2
15.3
6.3
-5.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
-3.4
-3.9
-5.0
-6.0 
1.4
0.0
-2.9
-6.0 
7.8
5.4
0.0
-6.0 
18.5
14.5
5.4
-6.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
-4.4
-4.9
-5.9
-7.0 
0.5
-0.9
-3.9
-7.0 
7.0
4.5
-0.9
-7.0 
17.7
13.7
4.5
-7.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
-5.4
-5.9
-6.9
-8.0 
-0.5
-1.9
-4.9
-8.0 
6.1
3.6
-1.9
-8.0 
16.9
12.9
3.6
-8.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
-6.3
-6.9
-7.9
-9.0 
-1.4
-2.8
-5.8
-9.0 
5.2
2.7
-2.8
-9.0 
16.2
12.1
2.7
-9.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
-7.3
-7.8
-8.9
-10.0 
-2.3
-3.8
-6.8
-10.0 
4.3
1.8
-3.8
-10.0 
15.4
11.3
1.8
-10.0 
See Und&VT concept 
(Table 15). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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Table D2: The Und part of the Und&VT concept (equation (D2)) applied to Annex I 
countries. The table lists the undershooting U contained in the modified 
emission limitation or reduction targets modδ  listed in Table D1, where the 
“ t ,2x -greater-than-( )KP t,11 xδ− ” risk α  is specified to be 0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. 
For further explanations confer to the captions of Tables 10 and 16. 
Undershooting U in %  
for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and 
Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Commit.  
δKPb 
% 
CRU 
ρcrit 
% α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und Concept 
had been applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 8.7 
2.2
1.8
0.9
0.0 
6.4
5.2
2.7
0.0 
12.0
9.9
5.2
0.0 
21.2
17.8
9.9
0.0 
2 20 7.0 7.5 
2.3
1.8
0.9
0.0 
6.5
5.3
2.7
0.0 
12.1
10.0
5.3
0.0 
21.5
18.0
10.0
0.0 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 6.4 
2.3
1.8
0.9
0.0 
6.6
5.3
2.7
0.0 
12.3
10.1
5.3
0.0 
21.7
18.2
10.1
0.0 
4 20 5.0 5.3 
2.3
1.9
0.9
0.0 
6.6
5.4
2.8
0.0 
12.4
10.2
5.4
0.0 
21.9
18.4
10.2
0.0 
-- -- 4.0 4.2 
2.3
1.9
1.0
0.0 
6.7
5.4
2.8
0.0 
12.5
10.3
5.4
0.0 
22.2
18.6
10.3
0.0 
-- -- 3.0 3.1 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
6.8
5.5
2.8
0.0 
12.7
10.4
5.5
0.0 
22.4
18.8
10.4
0.0 
-- -- 2.0 2.0 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
6.8
5.5
2.9
0.0 
12.8
10.5
5.5
0.0 
22.6
19.0
10.5
0.0 
-- -- 1.0 1.0 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
6.9
5.6
2.9
0.0 
12.9
10.6
5.6
0.0 
22.8
19.2
10.6
0.0 
See Und&VT concept 
(Table 10). 
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Table D2: continued. 
5 20 0.0 0.0 
2.4
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.0
5.7
2.9
0.0 
13.0
10.7
5.7
0.0 
23.1
19.4
10.7
0.0 
6 20 -1.0 1.0 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.0
5.7
2.9
0.0 
13.2
10.8
5.7
0.0 
23.3
19.5
10.8
0.0 
-- -- -2.0 2.0 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.1
5.8
3.0
0.0 
13.3
10.9
5.8
0.0 
23.5
19.7
10.9
0.0 
-- -- -3.0 2.9 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.2
5.8
3.0
0.0 
13.4
11.0
5.8
0.0 
23.8
19.9
11.0
0.0 
-- -- -4.0 3.8 
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.0 
7.3
5.9
3.0
0.0 
13.6
11.1
5.9
0.0 
24.0
20.1
11.1
0.0 
-- -- -5.0 4.8 
2.6
2.1
1.0
0.0 
7.3
5.9
3.1
0.0 
13.7
11.3
5.9
0.0 
24.2
20.3
11.3
0.0 
-- -- -6.0 5.7 
2.6
2.1
1.0
0.0 
7.4
6.0
3.1
0.0 
13.8
11.4
6.0
0.0 
24.5
20.5
11.4
0.0 
-- -- -7.0 6.5 
2.6
2.1
1.1
0.0 
7.5
6.1
3.1
0.0 
14.0
11.5
6.1
0.0 
24.7
20.7
11.5
0.0 
7 20 -8.0 7.4 
2.6
2.1
1.1
0.0 
7.5
6.1
3.1
0.0 
14.1
11.6
6.1
0.0 
24.9
20.9
11.6
0.0 
-- -- -9.0 8.3 
2.7
2.1
1.1
0.0 
7.6
6.2
3.2
0.0 
14.2
11.7
6.2
0.0 
25.2
21.1
11.7
0.0 
8 20 -10.0 9.1 
2.7
2.2
1.1
0.0 
7.7
6.2
3.2
0.0 
14.3
11.8
6.2
0.0 
25.4
21.3
11.8
0.0 
See Und&VT concept (Table 
16). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
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Table D3: The Und&VT concept (equation (D6)) applied to Annex I countries 
committed to emission reduction ( KP 0)δ > . The table lists “ t ,2x -greater-
than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk values vα  for the modified emission reduction 
targets modδ  presented in Table D1. For further explanations confer to the 
caption of Table 12. 
Changed Risk vα  for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
2 1t t−  
yr 
KP 
Com.
δKP 
% 
Crit. 
Targ.
δcrit 
% 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
α = 0.0
α = 0.1
α = 0.3
α = 0.5 
If the Und&VT 
Concept had been 
applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.210
0.305
0.494
αv n.d. 
0.355
0.439
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
2 20 7.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.249
0.343
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.375
0.457
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.074
0.173
0.371
αv n.d. 
0.287
0.380
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.394
0.475
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
4 20 5.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.149
0.247
0.443
αv n.d. 
0.325
0.416
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.412
0.493
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 4.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.222
0.319
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.361
0.452
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.431
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 3.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
take α
take α
take α
take α 
0.294
0.390
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.397
0.487
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.448
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 2.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
0.092
0.191
0.390
α' n.d. 
0.364
0.459
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.432
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.466
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
-- -- 1.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
0.298
0.397
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.433
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.466
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
0.483
αv n.d.
αv n.d.
αv n.d. 
See Und&VT concept (Table 
12). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
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Table D4: The Und&VT concept (equations (D3a), (D7a) and (D11a)) applied to 
Annex I countries. The table lists modified emission limitation or reduction 
targets modδ  for all Annex I countries, where the “ t ,2x -greater-than-
( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk vα  (Cases 2, 3) and the “ 2,tx -greater-than-
( )( )KP crit t,11 2 xδ δ− − ” risk vα  (Case 4), respectively, are specified to be 0, 
0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For the green-colored fields KP crit KP0 :δ δ δ> ≤  (Case 1), 
i.e., the modδ  values are taken from Table D1. For further explanations confer 
to the captions of Tables 13 and 17. 
Modified Emission Limitation 
or Reduction Target δmod 
in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and 
Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Com.
δKP b 
% 
Crit. 
Targ.
δcrit 
% 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
If the Und&VT 
Concept had been 
bpplied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
10.2
9.8
8.9
8.0 
14.4
13.2
10.7
8.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
2 20 7.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
9.3
8.8
7.9
7.0 
13.5
12.3
9.7
7.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
8.3
7.8
6.9
6.0 
13.5
12.2
9.7
7.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
4 20 5.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
7.3
6.9
5.9
5.0 
13.5
12.2
9.7
7.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
-- -- 4.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
6.3
5.9
5.0
4.0 
13.5
12.2
9.7
7.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
-- -- 3.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
5.4
4.9
4.0
3.0 
13.5
12.2
9.7
7.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
-- -- 2.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
4.8
4.4
3.4
2.4 
13.5
12.2
9.7
7.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
-- -- 1.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
4.8
4.4
3.4
2.4 
13.5
12.2
9.7
7.0 
24.4
22.4
18.0
13.0 
40.8
38.0
31.3
23.1 
See Und&VT concept (Table 
13). 
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Table D4: continued. 
5 20 0.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
4.9
4.5
3.5
2.6 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
6 20 -1.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
4.9
4.5
3.5
2.6 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
-- 
 
-2.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
4.9
4.5
3.5
2.6 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
-- 
 
-3.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
4.5
4.0
3.1
2.1 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
-- 
 
-4.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
3.5
3.1
2.1
1.1 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
-- 
 
-5.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
2.6
2.1
1.1
0.1 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
-- -- -6.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
1.6
1.1
0.1
-0.9 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
-- -- -7.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
0.6
0.1
-0.9
-1.9 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
7 20 -8.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-0.4
-0.9
-1.9
-2.9 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
-- -- -9.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-1.3
-1.8
-2.8
-3.9 
13.7
12.5
9.9
7.2 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
8 20 -10.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
-2.3
-2.8
-3.8
-4.9 
12.8
11.5
8.9
6.2 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
See Und&VT concept (Table 
17). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
 90
Table D5: The Und&VT concept (equations (D4), (D8) and (D12)) applied to Annex I 
countries. The table lists the undershooting vU  contained in the modified 
emission limitation or reduction targets modδ  listed in Table D4, where the 
“ t ,2x -greater-than-( )crit t ,11 xδ− ” risk vα  (Cases 2, 3) and the “ t ,2x -greater-
than- ( )( )KP crit t,11 2 xδ δ− − ” risk vα  (Case 4), respectively, are specified to be 
0, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. For the green-colored fields KP crit KP0 :δ δ δ> <  (Case 1), 
i.e., the U  values are taken from Table D2. For further explanations confer 
to the captions of Tables 14 and 18. 
Undershooting Uv in % for ρ = 
2.5% 7.5% 15% 30% 
and Country 
Group 
Max. 
Allow. 
VTa 
12 tt −  
yr 
KP 
Com.
δKP b 
% 
Crit. 
Targ.
δcrit 
% 
for ρ = 
2.5% 
7.5% 
15% 
30% 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
av = 0.0
av = 0.1
av = 0.3
av = 0.5 
If the Und&VT 
Concept had been 
applied 
1a 20 
1b 22 
1c 21 
1d 24 
8.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.2
1.8
0.9
0.0 
6.4
5.2
2.7
0.0 
16.4
14.4
10.0
5.0 
32.8
30.0
23.3
15.1 
2 20 7.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.3
1.8
0.9
0.0 
6.5
5.3
2.7
0.0 
17.4
15.4
11.0
6.0 
33.8
31.0
24.3
16.1 
3a 20 
3b 24 
3c 22 
6.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.3
1.8
0.9
0.0 
7.5
6.2
3.7
1.0 
18.4
16.4
12.0
7.0 
34.8
32.0
25.3
17.1 
4 20 5.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.3
1.9
0.9
0.0 
8.5
7.2
4.7
2.0 
19.4
17.4
13.0
8.0 
35.8
33.0
26.3
18.1 
-- -- 4.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.3
1.9
1.0
0.0 
9.5
8.2
5.7
3.0 
20.4
18.4
14.0
9.0 
36.8
34.0
27.3
19.1 
-- -- 3.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.0 
10.5
9.2
6.7
4.0 
21.4
19.4
15.0
10.0 
37.8
35.0
28.3
20.1 
-- -- 2.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
2.8
2.4
1.4
0.4 
11.5
10.2
7.7
5.0 
22.4
20.4
16.0
11.0 
38.8
36.0
29.3
21.1 
-- -- 1.0 
2.4 
7.0 
13.0 
23.1 
3.8
3.4
2.4
1.4 
12.5
11.2
8.7
6.0 
23.4
21.4
17.0
12.0 
39.8
37.0
30.3
22.1 
See Und&VT concept (Table 
14). 
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Table D5: continued. 
5 20 0.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
4.9
4.5
3.5
2.6 
14.5
13.3
10.8
8.1 
28.4
26.5
22.3
17.6 
56.0
53.9
49.0
42.9 
6 20 -1.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
5.9
5.5
4.5
3.6 
15.5
14.3
11.8
9.1 
29.4
27.5
23.3
18.6 
57.0
54.9
50.0
43.9 
-- 
 
-2.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
6.9
6.5
5.5
4.6 
16.5
15.3
12.8
10.1 
30.4
28.5
24.3
19.6 
58.0
55.9
51.0
44.9 
-- 
 
-3.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.5
7.0
6.1
5.1 
17.5
16.3
13.8
11.1 
31.4
29.5
25.3
20.6 
59.0
56.9
52.0
45.9 
-- 
 
-4.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.5
7.1
6.1
5.1 
18.5
17.3
14.8
12.1 
32.4
30.5
26.3
21.6 
60.0
57.9
53.0
46.9 
-- 
 
-5.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.6
7.1
6.1
5.1 
19.5
18.3
15.8
13.1 
33.4
31.5
27.3
22.6 
61.0
58.9
54.0
47.9 
-- -- -6.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.6
7.1
6.1
5.1 
20.5
19.3
16.8
14.1 
34.4
32.5
28.3
23.6 
62.0
59.9
55.0
48.9 
-- -- -7.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.6
7.1
6.1
5.1 
21.5
20.3
17.8
15.1 
35.4
33.5
29.3
24.6 
63.0
60.9
56.0
49.9 
7 20 -8.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.6
7.1
6.2
5.1 
22.5
21.3
18.8
16.1 
36.4
34.5
30.3
25.6 
64.0
61.9
57.0
50.9 
-- -- -9.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.7
7.2
6.2
5.1 
22.7
21.5
18.9
16.2 
37.4
35.5
31.3
26.6 
65.0
62.9
58.0
51.9 
8 20 -10.0 
-2.6 
-8.1 
-17.6 
-42.9 
7.7
7.2
6.2
5.1 
22.8
21.5
18.9
16.2 
38.4
36.5
32.3
27.6 
66.0
63.9
59.0
52.9 
See Und&VT concept (Table 
18). 
a
 The maximal allowable VT is calculated for each country group as the difference between 2010 (as the 
temporal mean over the commitment period 2008–2012) and its base year or mean base year, respectively 
(as specified in Table 5). 
b
 The countries’ emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are expressed 
with the help of KPδ , the normalized change in emissions between t1 and t2: KP 0δ >  – emission reduction; 
KP 0δ ≤  – emission limitation. 
 
 
 
